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650 points clcaev | 87 comments | | HN request time: 1.39s | source | bottom
1. metaphor ◴[] No.45063162[source]
> Immediately after the wreck at 9:14 p.m. on April 25, 2019, the crucial data detailing how it unfolded was automatically uploaded to the company’s servers and stored in a vast central database, according to court documents. Tesla’s headquarters soon sent an automated message back to the car confirming that it had received the collision snapshot.

> Moments later, court records show, the data was just as automatically “unlinked” from the 2019 Tesla Model S at the scene, meaning the local copy was marked for deletion, a standard practice for Teslas in such incidents, according to court testimony.

Wow...just wow.

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2. A4ET8a8uTh0_v2 ◴[] No.45063302[source]
I am trying to imagine a scenario under which that is defensible and does not raise various questions including compliance, legal, retention. Not to mention, who were the people who put that code into production knowing it would do that.

edit: My point is that it was not one lone actor, who would have made that change.

replies(3): >>45063366 #>>45063389 #>>45064252 #
3. colejohnson66 ◴[] No.45063366[source]
Assuming no malice, I'd guess it's for space saving on the car's internal memory. If the data was uploaded off of the car, there’s no point keeping it in the car.
replies(5): >>45063520 #>>45063627 #>>45064037 #>>45064183 #>>45065363 #
4. jeffbee ◴[] No.45063389[source]
The artifact in question was a temporary archive created for upload. I can't think of a scenario in which you would not unlink it.
replies(3): >>45063557 #>>45063579 #>>45064000 #
5. wat10000 ◴[] No.45063520{3}[source]
Sounds like a pretty standard telemetry upload. You transmit it, keep your copy until you get acknowledgement that it was received so you can retry if it went wrong, then delete it when it succeeds.

It’s just worded to make this sound sketchy. I bet ten bucks “unlinked” just refers to the standard POSIX call for deleting a file.

replies(5): >>45063580 #>>45063611 #>>45063712 #>>45063718 #>>45063727 #
6. JumpCrisscross ◴[] No.45063557{3}[source]
And then you delete the server copy?
replies(2): >>45063622 #>>45064025 #
7. constantly ◴[] No.45063579{3}[source]
> I can't think of a scenario in which you would not unlink it.

Perhaps if there is some sort of crash.

replies(1): >>45063851 #
8. tobias3 ◴[] No.45063580{4}[source]
Sketchy is that then someone takes “affirmative action to delete” the data on the server as well.

Also this is not like some process crash dump where the computer keeps running after one process crashed.

This would be like an plane black box uploading its data to the manufacturer, then deleting itself after a plane crash.

replies(1): >>45063612 #
9. buran77 ◴[] No.45063611{4}[source]
The process of collecting and uploading the data probably confuses a lot of non-technical readers even if it worked as per standard industry practices.

The real issue is that Tesla claimed the company doesn't have the data after every copy was deleted. There's no technical reason to dispose of data related to a crash when you hold so much data on all of the cars in general.

Crash data in particular should be considered sacred, especially given the severity in this case. Ideally it should be kept both on the local black box and on the servers. But anything that leads to it being treated as instantly disposable everywhere, or even just claiming it was deleted, can only be malice.

replies(2): >>45063918 #>>45064063 #
10. wat10000 ◴[] No.45063612{5}[source]
I’ll bet another ten bucks that this is a generic implementation for all of their telemetry, not something special cased for crashes.

Deleting the data on the server is totally sketchy, but that’s not what the quoted section is about.

replies(2): >>45064051 #>>45065073 #
11. jeffbee ◴[] No.45063622{4}[source]
Obviously no. The behavior of Tesla in discovery of this case is ridiculous. But treating this technical detail as an element of conspiracy is also ridiculous.
replies(1): >>45063977 #
12. OutOfHere ◴[] No.45063627{3}[source]
That's 100% wrong. In standard practice, collision files are to be "locked", prevented from local deletion.
replies(2): >>45064021 #>>45064043 #
13. raincole ◴[] No.45063632[source]
The 'wow' part is that they deleted data from server. The part you quoted sounds like nothing unusual to me.
replies(1): >>45063732 #
14. fny ◴[] No.45063687[source]
You left out the worse part:

> someone at Tesla probably took “affirmative action to delete” the copy of the data on the company’s central database, too

15. alistairSH ◴[] No.45063712{4}[source]
That might be the case but the article seems to indicate the system knew the data was generated from an accident. So, removing to save space on the car should now be a secondary concern.
16. joshcryer ◴[] No.45063718{4}[source]
The problem with this is that it destroys any chain of evidence. Tesla "lost" this data, in fact. You would never want your "black box" in your car delete itself after uploading to some service because the service could go down, be hacked, or the provider could decide to withhold it, forcing you into a lengthy discovery / custody battle.

This data is yours. You were going the speed limit when the accident happened and everyone else claims you were speeding. It would take forever to clear your name or worse you could be convicted if the data was lost.

This is more of "you will own nothing" crap. And mainly so Tesla can cover its ass.

17. aredox ◴[] No.45063727{4}[source]
It is a car. A vehicule which can be involved in a fatal accident. It is not a website. There is no "oversight", nor is it "pretty standard" to do it like that: when you don't think about what your system is actually doing (and that is the most charitable explanation), YOU ARE STILL RESPONSIBLE AS IF YOU HAD DONE IT ON PURPOSE.
replies(1): >>45063780 #
18. lexicality ◴[] No.45063732[source]
You don't think it's unusual that the software is designed to delete crash data from the crashed car?
replies(3): >>45063809 #>>45063911 #>>45064066 #
19. wat10000 ◴[] No.45063780{5}[source]
One of Tesla’s things is that their software is built by software people rather than by car people. This has advantages and disadvantages.

Maybe this is not appropriate for a car, but that doesn’t excuse the ridiculous breathless tone in the quoted text. It’s the worst purple prose making a boring system sound exciting and nefarious. They could have made your point without trying to make the unlink() call sound suspicious.

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20. foobarian ◴[] No.45063809{3}[source]
Think of it as the scripts that run on CI/CD actions running unit tests. If a unit test fails, the test artifacts are uploaded to an artifact repository, and then, get this - the test runner instance is destroyed! But we don't think of that as unusual or nefarious.
replies(4): >>45063848 #>>45063858 #>>45063869 #>>45070944 #
21. lexicality ◴[] No.45063848{4}[source]
That's because typically the test runner hasn't just crashed into another test runner at full highway speed
22. artursapek ◴[] No.45063851{4}[source]
Exactly. That's the last data I would ever delete from the car, if I was trying to preserve valuable data.
replies(2): >>45064006 #>>45064035 #
23. smallpipe ◴[] No.45063858{4}[source]
No one dies when your unit test fails. Different stakes, different practices, what are all the Tesla apologists smoking here?
24. Ambroisie ◴[] No.45063869{4}[source]
I don't think you can equate CI/CD unit tests and killing humans with 2 tons of metal.
replies(1): >>45064462 #
25. Thorrez ◴[] No.45063911{3}[source]
The question is whether this is code that's special for crashes, or code that runs the exact same way for all data uploads, regardless of whether there's a crash.

You're implying it's special for crashes, but we don't know that.

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26. wat10000 ◴[] No.45063918{5}[source]
> The real issue is that Tesla claimed the company doesn't have the data after every copy was deleted.

Exactly. The issue is deleting the data on the servers, not a completely mundane upload-then-delete procedure for phoning home. This should have been one sentence, but instead they make it read like a heist.

27. buran77 ◴[] No.45063958{6}[source]
> their software is built by software people rather than by car people

The rogue engineer defense worked so well for VW and Dieselgate.

The issue of missing crash data was raised repeatedly. Deleting or even just claiming it was deleted can only be a mistake the first time.

replies(1): >>45065786 #
28. actionfromafar ◴[] No.45063977{5}[source]
If that was the only thing going wrong, yes. But when you have a pattern of conspiracy, deleting immediately on the client instead of having a ring buffer which ages out the oldest event, may be a malicious choice.
replies(1): >>45064049 #
29. ryandvm ◴[] No.45063980[source]
It is wild to me that people put so much trust in this company.

Even if Tesla hadn't squandered it's EV lead and was instead positioned to be a robotics and AI superpower, is this really the corporate behavior you would want? This is some fucking Aperture Science level corporate malfeasance.

replies(2): >>45064185 #>>45064285 #
30. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064000{3}[source]
You were right in your first statement, but your follow up is a bad assumption, I think everyone here will agree that in the case of a crash this data should be more easily available and not deleted.

Assuming its not intentionally malicious this is a really dumb bug that I could have also written. You zip up a bunch of data, and then you realize that if you don't delete things you've uploaded you will fill up all available storage, so what do you do? You auto delete anything that successfully makes it to the back-end server, you mark the bug fixed, not realizing that you overlooked crash data as something you might want to keep.

I could 100% see this being what is happening.

31. jeffbee ◴[] No.45064006{5}[source]
What if you were the guy who got a ticket that just said "implement telemetry upload via HTTP"?

Which of these is evidence of a conspiracy:

  tar cf - | curl
  TMPFILE=$(mktemp) ; tar cf $TMPFILE ; curl -d $TMPFILE ; rm $TMPFILE
replies(1): >>45064141 #
32. phkahler ◴[] No.45064021{4}[source]
>> That's 100% wrong. In standard practice, collision files are to be "locked", prevented from local deletion.

I worked a year in airbag control, and they recorded a bit of information if the bags were deployed - seatbelt buckle status was one thing. But I was under the impression there was no legal requirement for that. I'm sure it helps in court when someone tries to sue because they were injured by an airbag. The argument becomes not just "the bags comply with the law" but also "you weren't wearing your seatbelt". Regardless, I'm sure Tesla has a lot more data than that and there is likely no legal requirement to keep it - especially if it's been transferred reliably to the server.

33. semiquaver ◴[] No.45064025{4}[source]
They didn’t delete the server copy though. That’s what this article is about.

  > Tesla later said in court that it had the data on its own servers all along
replies(1): >>45064939 #
34. lexicality ◴[] No.45064033{4}[source]
The crash system uses this code, therefore they chose to do something that would delete the crash data after a crash.

Saying "hey, the upload_and_delete function is used in loads of places!" doesn't free you of the responsibility that you used that function in the crash handler.

replies(1): >>45064052 #
35. alias_neo ◴[] No.45064035{5}[source]
All of their actions point at intentionally wanting that data to disappear, they even suggested turning it on and updating it, which everyone who's ever tried to protect important information on a computer knows is that exact opposite to what you should do.

Any competent engineer who puts more than 3 seconds of thought into the design of that system would conclude that crash data is critical evidence and as many steps as possible should be taken to ensure it's retained with additional fail safes.

I refuse to believe Tesla's engineers aren't at least competent, so this must have been done intentionally.

36. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064037{3}[source]
I think your answer is the most logical to me as a developer, we often miss simple things, the PM overlooks it, and so it goes into production this way. I don't think its malicious. Sometimes bugs just don't become obvious until things break. We have all found an unintended consequence of our code that had nothing wrong with it technically sooner or later.
37. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064043{4}[source]
I don't think its wrong, have you ever pushed code that was technically correct, only to find months later that you, your PM, their manager, their boss' boss, etc all missed one edge case? You're telling me no software developer has ever done this?
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38. jeffbee ◴[] No.45064049{6}[source]
I haven't seen anything in the (characteristically terrible and vague) coverage of this case that suggests the Tesla deleted the EDR.
39. dylan604 ◴[] No.45064051{6}[source]
How handling an automobile crash not as a special case is the weird part. Even in the <$50 dashcams from Amazon there is a feature to mark a recording as locked so the auto delete logic does not touch the locked file. Some of them even have automatic collision detection which locks the file for you.

How Tesla could say that detecting a collision and not locking all/any of the data is normal is just insane.

replies(1): >>45064777 #
40. Thorrez ◴[] No.45064052{5}[source]
Is this a crash handler, or is it their normal telemetry upload loop?
replies(1): >>45064083 #
41. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064063{5}[source]
> The real issue is that Tesla claimed the company doesn't have the data after every copy was deleted. There's no technical reason to dispose of data related to a crash when you hold so much data on all of the cars in general.

My money is on nobody built a tool to look up the data, so they have it, they just can't easily find it.

replies(1): >>45064276 #
42. phkahler ◴[] No.45064066{3}[source]
>> You don't think it's unusual that the software is designed to delete crash data from the crashed car?

After it confirmed upload to the server? What if it was a minor collision? The car may be back on the road the same day, or get repaired and on the road next week. How long should it retain data (that is not legally required to be logged) that has already been archived, and how big does the buffer need to be?

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43. lexicality ◴[] No.45064083{6}[source]
Yes, it's a crash handler that uploads a blackbox "collision snapshot" of the entire car's state leading up to a crash. It's very well documented that Tesla does this, including in the article.
44. dylan604 ◴[] No.45064087{4}[source]
You have it backwards. The fact that after the special condition of a crash it still allows the data to be deleted is an issue. Sure, deleting of normal data is fine, but it clearly detected a crash and did not mark the file in the special crash mode as do not delete is mind boggling. Everyone knows that in a crash detection mode that the data is very important. Not having code to ensure data retention is the laziest at best way of doing things or malevolently designed at worst. Tesla and its leadership do not deserve at best as our default choice.
45. 1vuio0pswjnm7 ◴[] No.45064115[source]
The top HN comment on the front page story about this crash on HN several weeks ago claimed the damages award was too high

Maybe this thread will be different

46. alias_neo ◴[] No.45064141{6}[source]
That's reductive.

The requirements should have been clear that crash data isn't just "implement telemetry upload", a "collision snapshot" is quite clearly something that could be used as evidence in a potentially serious incident.

Unless your entire engineering process was geared towards collecting as much data that can help you, and as little data as can be used against you, you'd handle this like the crown jewels.

Also, to nit-pick, the article says the automated response "marked" for deletion, which means it's not automatically deleted as your reductive example which doesn't verify it was successfully uploaded (at least && the last rm).

47. lexicality ◴[] No.45064162{4}[source]
A very simple answer is "until the next time the car crashes", you just replace the previous crash data with the new data.

If the car requires that a certain amount of storage is always available to write crash data to, then it doesn't matter what's in that particular area of storage. That reserved storage is always going to be unavailable for other general use.

48. const_cast ◴[] No.45064183{3}[source]
Dude we're at the point where cars are practically gathering data on the size of your big toe.

The performance ship sailed, like, 15 years ago. We're already storing about 10000000 more data than we need. And that's not even an exaggeration.

49. flatline ◴[] No.45064185[source]
It’s pretty typical of corporations, the cult surrounding its leader notwithstanding. Not even just US corporations - the VW emissions scandal was huge, and today they are doing as well as ever. That was a big shakeup; the kind of stuff we are seeing from Tesla feels like business as usual.
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50. const_cast ◴[] No.45064225{6}[source]
There are software people who know what they're doing - some write flight software or medical equipment software. They know how to critically think about the processes of their systems in detail.

So either the problem is Tesla engineers are fucking stupid (doubtful) or this is a poor business/product design.

My money is on the latter.

51. throwway120385 ◴[] No.45064231{6}[source]
I'm a software person but I still take the car person approach when I know i'm building a car. You have a responsibility to understand the gravity of the enterprise you undertake and to take appropriate steps given that gravity. Ignorance shouldn't be a defense, and if you don't know what you don't know then god help you.
52. ozim ◴[] No.45064252[source]
Well if it would be EU for GDPR you can assume contract was terminated because of force majeure and you are not allowed to keep customer data past contract. /s
53. ◴[] No.45064276{6}[source]
54. lotsofpulp ◴[] No.45064285[source]
I just hate the corrupt laws mandating car dealerships.
replies(1): >>45068105 #
55. sim7c00 ◴[] No.45064288{4}[source]
if its not special for crashes thats criminally bad design in a safety critical system.

u know if for instance u weld a gas pipeline and an xray machine reveal a crack in your work, you can go to jail.... but if you treat car software as an appstore item, totally fine??

stop defending ridiculously bad design and corporate practices.

56. estearum ◴[] No.45064425{3}[source]
No, it's not typical, because you don't see huge numbers of people defending VW's emissions fraud.
replies(1): >>45064886 #
57. foobarian ◴[] No.45064462{5}[source]
And yet, that's what you get when your software org comes from that kind of devops culture. And here we are
58. buran77 ◴[] No.45064475{5}[source]
You discover it the day you a person dies and your relevant data is not there. Next time it's no longer a "missed edge case".
replies(1): >>45064730 #
59. LightBug1 ◴[] No.45064513{3}[source]
Nope - the VW episode was terrible, but they faced large fines and corrected course and it's history. I'm still slightly squeamish about accepting them but they've turned it around and I think I read have just overtaken Tesla in EV sales in Europe (a self-inflicted Musk wound, of course).

I see no course correction from Tesla. Just continuing and utter tripe from it's CEO, team, and Musk-d-riders.

This is an on-going issue for them and, at this point, with no further change? I hope it drives them into the ground (Autopilot, natch).

replies(1): >>45064564 #
60. fred_is_fred ◴[] No.45064564{4}[source]
You can actively criticize VW on the internet without an army of sycophants coming for you. The standard behavior of Tesla stans is that any problem with the vehicle is in fact your fault and only your fault because it would not be possible for Tesla to do something wrong. It is cult-like.
61. watwut ◴[] No.45064589{3}[source]
VW emission scandal ended with actual judgement and two prison sentences.

Miles and miles different - they were not completely untouchable the way tesla and similar hot companies are.

62. kergonath ◴[] No.45064627{6}[source]
> One of Tesla’s things is that their software is built by software people rather than by car people. This has advantages and disadvantages.

So we just shrug because software boys gotta be software boys? That’s completely insane and a big reason why a lot of engineers roll their eyes about developers who want to be considered engineers.

Software engineers who work on projects that can kill people must act like the lives of other people depend on them doing their job seriously, because that is the case. Look at the aviation industry. Is it acceptable to have a bug in the avionics suite down planes at random and then delete the black boxes? It absolutely is not, and when anything like that happens shit gets serious (think 737 MAX).

The developers who designed the systems are responsible, and so are their managers who approved the changes, all the way to the top. This would not happen in a company with appropriate processes in place.

replies(1): >>45066067 #
63. kergonath ◴[] No.45064716{4}[source]
> What if it was a minor collision?

Then, I don’t know… Check if it was the case? Seriously, it’s unbelievable. It’s a company with a protocol to delete possibly incriminating evidence in a situation where it can be responsible for multiple deaths.

64. OutOfHere ◴[] No.45064726{5}[source]
It's not an edge case; it's wanton criminal sabotage, destruction of evidence, and it deserves a prison sentence for anyone facilitating it at any level.
replies(1): >>45064738 #
65. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064730{6}[source]
In a perfect world where developers are omnipresent and all knowing sure? This isn't a perfect world. Heck, how do you account for the developer who coded it leaving the company, and now that code has been untouched for half a decade if not more, because nothing is seemingly wrong with the code, what then? Who realizes it needs to be changed? Nobody. The number of obscure bugs I find in legacy code that stump even the most experienced maintainers never ends.
replies(1): >>45065448 #
66. giancarlostoro ◴[] No.45064738{6}[source]
This is assuming malice out of the gate without any evidence, which is not what we do here on HN. If this is in fact maliciously done, please provide evidence.
67. immibis ◴[] No.45064777{7}[source]
That one's easy: nobody at Tesla cares about having this feature
68. SoftTalker ◴[] No.45064886{4}[source]
I don't defend it but the specifics never bothered me. They cheated because their cars didn't meet new emissions standards. They were fine by the standards of the year before. So a bureaucracy just declared that a legal level of emissions was now illegal.

In my mind it's like suddenly declaring that blue cars are illegal, and they made a color-shifting car that is blue except when the authorities are looking at it.

It is wrong in the sense that it is normalizion of deviance, however. We live in a society and if we don't like a law or regulation the correct response is to get it legally changed, not to ignore it and cheat.

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69. JumpCrisscross ◴[] No.45064939{5}[source]
Wasn’t that after they’d been caught?
replies(1): >>45067742 #
70. estearum ◴[] No.45064953{5}[source]
I didn't say you are defending it. I'm saying that "companies do bad things sometimes" is not a full description of the Tesla phenomenon that people take issue with.
71. pjob ◴[] No.45065073{6}[source]
That might not be a good bet. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45063380
replies(1): >>45066085 #
72. ajross ◴[] No.45065363{3}[source]
In point of fact eMMC wear failure was an actual bug in early Tesla MCUs. They were logging too much, so when the car reached (via routine use) a certain fill level the logging started running over the same storage again and again and the chips started failing.

It's very easy to imagine a response to this being (beyond "don't log so much") an audit layer to start automatically removing redundant data.

The externalities of the company are such that people want to ascribe malice, but this is a very routine kind of thing.

replies(1): >>45066711 #
73. matthewdgreen ◴[] No.45065448{7}[source]
There have been dozens of government investigations and lawsuits around Tesla crashes over the past decade (more likely hundreds or thousands, I'm just thinking of the ones that received significant national press and that I happened to notice.) In each of these cases, Tesla's data retention was questioned, sometimes by regulators and sometimes as a major legal question in the case. There is no way in 2025 that the retention process around crash data is some niche area of Tesla's code that the business leaders haven't thought about extremely carefully.

This is like saying "maybe nobody has recently looked at the ad-selection mechanism at Google." That's just not plausible.

74. wat10000 ◴[] No.45065786{7}[source]
I really should know better than to think that I can criticize a small part of an article without a bunch of people thinking that I'm defending everything the article discusses.
75. wat10000 ◴[] No.45066067{7}[source]
I completely agree about responsibility for life-critical systems. I wouldn't put this in that category, though. Even on airliners, black boxes aren't treated quite as critically as the stuff that'll kill you then and there. Consider the recent crash in Korea where the black box shut off because it was designed without any backup power if the engines failed, or the Alaska Airlines flight where the voice recording was overwritten because it wasn't shut off after landing.

I'd argue that this data is far less important in cars. Airline safety has advanced to the point where crashes are extremely rare and usually have a novel cause. Data recorders are important to be able to learn that cause and figure out how to prevent it from happening again. Car safety, on the other hand, is shit. We don't require rigorous training for the operators. Regulations are lax, and enforcement even more lax. Infrastructure is poor. We're unwilling to fix these things. Almost all safety efforts focus on making the vehicles more robust when collisions occur, and we're just starting to see some effort put into making the vehicles automatically avoid some collisions. What are we going to learn from this data in cars? "Driver didn't stop for a red light, hit cross traffic." "Driver was drunk." "Driver failed to see pedestrian because of bad intersection design which has been known for fifty years and never been fixed." It's useful for assigning liability but not very useful for saving lives. There's a ton of lower hanging fruit to go after before you start combing through vehicle telemetry to find unknown problems.

Even if you do consider it to be life-critical, uploading the data and then deleting the local copy once receipt is acknowledged seems completely fine, if the server infrastructure is solid. Better than only keeping a local copy, even. The issue there is that they either have inadequate controls allowing data to be deleted, or inadequate ability to retrieve data.

76. wat10000 ◴[] No.45066085{7}[source]
I don't see anything in that comment that would apply to what I said.
77. dahinds ◴[] No.45066403{5}[source]
> They cheated because their cars didn't meet new emissions standards. They were fine by the standards of the year before.

> So a bureaucracy just declared that a legal level of emissions was now illegal.

That is not at all what happened and not how emissions standards are deployed. The EPA's Tier 2 standards were finalized in 2000 to phase in during the 2004-2008 model years [1].

[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/02/10/00-19/c...

78. A4ET8a8uTh0_v2 ◴[] No.45066711{4}[source]
This, I think, was the argument that seems most plausible to me ( without ascribing malice ). It brings its own set of issues, but even those issues make it more believable despite being problematic in their own right.
79. triceratops ◴[] No.45067541{5}[source]
> They cheated because their cars didn't meet new emissions standards

Anything beyond the first two words in that sentence is irrelevant.

80. semiquaver ◴[] No.45067742{6}[source]
Yes.
81. gamblor956 ◴[] No.45068105{3}[source]
The reason for the laws mandating dealerships was to have a local party accountable to local laws, i.e., for service, lemons, excess inventory filling up neighborhood parking spots...

Tesla is speedrunning several decades of automotive history to demonstrate why dealership laws became a thing in the first place.

replies(1): >>45068194 #
82. lotsofpulp ◴[] No.45068194{4}[source]
It’s 2025, it is trivial to hold all businesses accountable in any jurisdiction they do business in, especially with how easy it is to freeze electronic money accounts.

You can’t even sell something to someone in a different state without having to remit various taxes, even if you didn’t step foot in that state. A car manufacturing multi billion dollar business sure as hell isn’t getting away with it.

I am also not sure how a dealership would have preventer Tesla from deleting crash data, and falsely claiming it did.

replies(2): >>45068572 #>>45070571 #
83. mvdtnz ◴[] No.45068572{5}[source]
> It’s 2025, it is trivial to hold all businesses accountable in any jurisdiction they do business in,

Trivial? You don't really believe that do you?

replies(1): >>45069054 #
84. lotsofpulp ◴[] No.45069054{6}[source]
The mechanics are trivial. The legal filings, the communication, the seizure of assets (compared to 100 years ago).

The political will might not be, but that has nothing to do with dealerships.

85. gamblor956 ◴[] No.45070571{5}[source]
You can’t even sell something to someone in a different state without having to remit various taxes, even if you didn’t step foot in that state.

This is not true. Sales taxes have a threshold requirement before out-of-state retailers are required to collect and remit sales taxes for customers in a state. It's usually 200 transactions or $100,000. If you're doing that much business with a state, you can and should be able to handle sales tax. And if you don't want to deal with it yourself, you can use a third party service like Avalara or TaxJar to handle the sales tax compliance for you (rate calculation, remittance, and returns).

especially with how easy it is to freeze electronic money accounts.

That is actually very difficult to do in the U.S. Generally, freezing accounts is limited to certain criminal matters or regulatory violations. It doesn't happen in civil litigation. At most the judge can order withholding or garnishment if the penalized party evades payment of the judgment.

I am also not sure how a dealership would have preventer Tesla from deleting crash data, and falsely claiming it did.

In most states, you can just go to a local dealer (or service center) to recover data from a vehicle if you can't do it using a third party. It's generally quite rare to go to the automaker to pull data from a vehicle. That's a Tesla specific thing, except in rare situations where a vehicle may be so damaged that special expertise is required.

86. ndsipa_pomu ◴[] No.45070934{4}[source]
Keep it until any pending court cases or insurance investigation is complete.
87. ndsipa_pomu ◴[] No.45070944{4}[source]
That's a particularly unhelpful analogy. Car telemetry is linked to real world physical objects and real human suffering, whereas CI/CD actions may be linked to the happiness of a project manager etc.