Why is this the case? I don't understand, can somebody explain the logic to me here?
replies(6):
1.1 Strong protection against account takeover
Email change is one of the most abused recovery vectors in account takeover (ATO).
Eliminating email changes removes:
Social-engineering attacks on support
SIM-swap → email-change chains
Phished session → email swap → lockout of real user
Attacker must compromise the original inbox permanently, which is much harder.
1.2 No “high-risk” flows
Email change flows are among the highest-risk product flows:
Dual confirmation emails
Cooldown periods
Rollback windows
Manual reviews
Fixed email removes an entire class of security-critical code paths.
1.3 Fewer recovery attack surfaces No need for:
“I lost access to my email” flows
Identity verification uploads
Support-driven ownership disputes
Every recovery mechanism is an attack surface; removing them reduces risk.
Not having email change functionality would have been a huge usability, security, and customer service nightmare for us.
Regardless of anything else, not enabling users to change their email address effectively binds them to business with a single organization. It also ignores the fact that people can and do change emails for entirely opaque reasons from the banal to the authentically emergent.
ATO attacks are a fig leaf for such concerns, because you, as an organization, always have the power to revert a change to contact information. You just need to establish a process. It takes some consideration and table topping, but it’s not rocket science for a competent team.