Unless there is some deep technical reason why things have to be this way, which I very much doubt.
And now they can't change it? Where is Claude when you need him/her
I'm just guessing, but the above might suggest a potential incentive: They would like you to hand over a valuable/longterm email, as opposed to a temporary email (for supposedly more privacy or testing), by making it difficult to change it later.
'Dark patterns are the pavement of todays corporate infrastructure.'
> I'd recommend against using email as the primary key for a large LLM chat website. Here's why:
> Problems with email as primary key:
> 1. Emails change - Users often want to update their email addresses. With email as PK, you'd need to cascade updates across all related tables (chat sessions, messages, settings, etc.), which is expensive and error-prone
> [Edited for length]
Obviously, there's a way to do that still. Not saying it's a good idea. But if I had to guess as to why, that's the one that comes to mind.
1.1 Strong protection against account takeover
Email change is one of the most abused recovery vectors in account takeover (ATO).
Eliminating email changes removes:
Social-engineering attacks on support
SIM-swap → email-change chains
Phished session → email swap → lockout of real user
Attacker must compromise the original inbox permanently, which is much harder.
1.2 No “high-risk” flows
Email change flows are among the highest-risk product flows:
Dual confirmation emails
Cooldown periods
Rollback windows
Manual reviews
Fixed email removes an entire class of security-critical code paths.
1.3 Fewer recovery attack surfaces No need for:
“I lost access to my email” flows
Identity verification uploads
Support-driven ownership disputes
Every recovery mechanism is an attack surface; removing them reduces risk.
Not having email change functionality would have been a huge usability, security, and customer service nightmare for us.
Regardless of anything else, not enabling users to change their email address effectively binds them to business with a single organization. It also ignores the fact that people can and do change emails for entirely opaque reasons from the banal to the authentically emergent.
ATO attacks are a fig leaf for such concerns, because you, as an organization, always have the power to revert a change to contact information. You just need to establish a process. It takes some consideration and table topping, but it’s not rocket science for a competent team.