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Stop Breaking TLS

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170 points todsacerdoti | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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samuel ◴[] No.46215799[source]
I agree with the sentiment, but I think it's a pretty naive view of the issue. Companies will want all info they can in case some of their workers does something illegal-inappropiate to deflect the blame. That's a much more palpable risk than "local CA certificates being compromised or something like that.

And some of the arguments are just very easily dismissed. You don't want your employer to see you medical records? Why were you browsing them during work hours and using your employers' device in the first place?

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immibis ◴[] No.46215855[source]
In Europe they prefer not to go to jail for privacy violations. It turns out most of these "communist" regulations are actually pretty great.
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johncolanduoni ◴[] No.46215994[source]
Does GDPR (or similar) establish privacy rights to an employee’s use of a company-owned machine against snooping by their employer? Honest question, I hadn’t heard of that angle. Can employers not install EDR on company-owned machines for EU employees?
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apexalpha ◴[] No.46216082[source]
Yes, at least in the Netherlands it is generally accepted that employees can use your device personally, too.

Using a device owned by your company to access your personal GMail account does NOT void your legal right to privacy.

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johncolanduoni ◴[] No.46216551[source]
So does nobody in Europe use an EDR or intercepting proxy since GDPR went into force?
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samuel ◴[] No.46217001[source]
I have found a definite answer from the Dutch Protection Agency (although it could be out of date).

https://english.ncsc.nl/binaries/ncsc-en/documenten/factshee...

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johncolanduoni ◴[] No.46222315[source]
What’s the definitive answer? From what I can tell that document is mostly about security risks and only mentions privacy compliance in a single paragraph (with no specific guidance). It definitely doesn’t say you can or can’t use one.
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immibis ◴[] No.46222484{6}[source]
That's probably because there is no answer. Many laws apply to the total thing you are creating end-to-end.

Even the most basic law like "do not murder" is not "do not pull gun triggers" and a gun's technical reference manual would only be able to give you a vague statement like "Be aware of local laws before activating the device."

Legal privacy is not about whether you intercept TLS or not; it's about whether someone is spying on you, which is an end-to-end operation. Should someone be found to be spying on you, then you can go to court and they will decide who has to pay the price for that. And that decision can be based on things like whether some intermediary network has made poor security decisions.

This is why corporations do bullshit security by the way. When we on HN say "it's for liability reasons" this is what it means - it means when a court is looking at who caused a data breach, your company will have plausible deniability. "Your Honour, we use the latest security system from CrowdStrike" sounds better than "Your Honour, we run an unpatched Unix system from 1995 and don't connect it to the Internet" even though us engineers know the latter is probably more secure against today's most common attacks.

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1. johncolanduoni ◴[] No.46222638{7}[source]
Okay, thanks for explaining the general concept of law to me, but this provides literally no information to figure out the conditions under which an employer using a TLS intercepting proxy to snoop on the internet traffic a work laptop violates GDPR. I never asked for a definitive answer just, you know, an answer that is remotely relevant to the question.

I don’t really need to know, but a bunch of people seemed really confident they knew the answer and then provided no actual information except vague gesticulation about PII.

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2. immibis ◴[] No.46236465[source]
Are they using it to snoop on the traffic, or are they merely using it to block viruses? Lack of encryption is not a guarantee of snooping. I know in the USA it can be assumed that you can do whatever you want with unencrypted traffic, which guarantees that if your traffic is unencrypted, someone is snooping on it. In Europe, this might not fly outside of three-letter agencies (who you should still be scared of, but they are not your employer).