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Final report on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 in-flight exit door plug separation

(www.ntsb.gov:443)
165 points starkparker | 1 comments | 10 Jul 25 20:51 UTC | HN request time: 0s | source
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thomascountz ◴[10 Jul 25 21:46 UTC] No.44525985[source]▶
> We determined that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the left MED plug due to Boeing’s failure to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight necessary to ensure that manufacturing personnel could consistently and correctly comply with its parts removal process, which was intended to document and ensure that the securing bolts and hardware that were removed to facilitate rework during the manufacturing process were properly reinstalled.

A bit OT, but what a gorgeous whale of a sentence! As always, the literary prowess of NTSB writers does not disappoint.

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JoshTriplett ◴[10 Jul 25 22:27 UTC] No.44526384[source]▶
Also, I really appreciate the way they put blame where it belongs. They don't say "manufacturing personnel failed to ...", they say "Boeing failed to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight necessary to ensure that manufacturing personnel could consistently and correctly ...".
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mrandish ◴[10 Jul 25 22:38 UTC] No.44526480[source]▶
Agreed about properly assigning the root cause to inadequate training but the sentence was unnecessarily complex in not making the first order cause clear until the end. I'd prefer stating up front that the first order cause was "securing bolts and hardware that were removed to facilitate rework" were not reinstalled - and then stating the root cause leading to that being inadequate training.

In the context of a summary I just expect the core sentence to take events in order from the headline failure ("in-flight exit door plug separation") and then work back to the root cause.

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lobochrome ◴[10 Jul 25 22:49 UTC] No.44526570[source]▶
In the end - action matters. Somebody didn’t put the bolts back in.

Yes - zooming out it important and ultimately where actionable remediation can be applied - but blame is due where blame is due: somebody fucked up at work and it almost brought down a plane.

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1. mrandish ◴[11 Jul 25 00:14 UTC] No.44527130{3}[source]▶
Others already said it but since I'm the person you responded to, I'll reiterate that my suggestion was only about reordering the sequence of that sentence for better clarity, not about placing blame on individuals over process. When a failure can cause serious consequences including killing people, proper system design should never even permit a single point of failure to exist, especially one relying on humans to always perform correctly and completely. Even well-trained, highly-conscientious humans can make a mistake. While these people should have received better training as well as comprehensive sequential checklists, a good system design will have critical failure points such as this each verified and signed off by a separate inspector.

The problem with a culture which prioritizes "blame is due where blame is due" is it can cause people to not report near-misses and other gaps as well as cover-up actual mistakes. The shift in the U.S. from blaming (and penalizing) occasional pilot lapses to a more 'blameless' default mode was controversial but has now clearly demonstrated that it nets better overall safety.