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314 points Bogdanp | 8 comments | | HN request time: 1.241s | source | bottom
1. msgodel ◴[] No.44380911[source]
This is incredibly dumb. The three way handshake and initial key exchange is your certificate.
replies(2): >>44381814 #>>44382226 #
2. cpburns2009 ◴[] No.44381814[source]
That would be fine if browsers didn't throw up giant warning signs when using self-signed certificates.
replies(2): >>44382565 #>>44383358 #
3. Dylan16807 ◴[] No.44382226[source]
And this protects you from a hostile network how?
replies(1): >>44382560 #
4. msgodel ◴[] No.44382560[source]
How does the certificate? If you already have to do the TLS handshake it doesn't change anything.
replies(1): >>44383605 #
5. msgodel ◴[] No.44382565[source]
That sounds like a defect in the browser design.

Or maybe it's because you actually want an identity to verify (which an IP address is not.)

6. nijave ◴[] No.44383358[source]
Usually you can just import the leaf self signed cert as a CA in your OS trust store and the problem goes away (assuming it has an IP SAN). Slightly tedious but you can issue the certs with long validity
7. Dylan16807 ◴[] No.44383605{3}[source]
A verified certificate lets you know you didn't handshake with an attacker in the middle.
replies(1): >>44387620 #
8. msgodel ◴[] No.44387620{4}[source]
Let me rephrase that: How is the CA supposed to know they didn't handshake with an attacker? All they have is the IP, there's no identity to check like with DNS.