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169 points hunvreus | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.205s | source
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londons_explore ◴[] No.43653973[source]
Unmentioned: there are serious security issues with memory cloning code not designed for it.

For example, an SSL library might have pre-calculated the random nonce for the next incoming SSL connection.

If you clone the VM containing a process using that library, now both child VM's will use the same nonce. Some crypto is 100% broken open if a nonce is reused.

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1. hedora ◴[] No.43654702[source]
I was about to say you were being paranoid, then I read the article. It hadn’t occurred to me that anyone would be so reckless!

The proposed workflow involves cloning your dev environment and sharing it with the internet.

At most places, that’s equivalent to publishing your production keys, or at least github credentials.

Even for open source projects where confidentiality doesn’t matter, there are issues like using cargo/npm/etc keys to launch supply chain attacks.

Your nonce attack is harder to pull off, but more devastating if the attacker can man in the middle things like dependency downloads.