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Private Cloud Compute Security Guide

(security.apple.com)
295 points djoldman | 8 comments | 06 Nov 24 13:48 UTC | HN request time: 0.853s | source | bottom
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jagrsw ◴[06 Nov 24 14:25 UTC] No.42062732[source]▶
If Apple controls the root of trust, like the private keys in the CPU or security processor used to check the enclave (similar to how Intel and AMD do it with SEV-SNP and TDX), then technically, it's a "trust us" situation, since they likely use their own ARM silicon for that?

Harder to attack, sure, but no outside validation. Apple's not saying "we can't access your data," just "we're making it way harder for bad guys (and rogue employees) to get at it."

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1. skylerwiernik ◴[06 Nov 24 14:44 UTC] No.42063040[source]▶
I don't think they do. Your phone cryptographically verifies that the software running on the servers is what it says it is, and you can't pull the keys out of the secure enclave. They also had independent auditors go over the whole thing and publish a report. If the chip is disconnected from the system it will dump its keys and essentially erase all data.
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2. plagiarist ◴[06 Nov 24 15:04 UTC] No.42063402[source]▶
I don't understand how publishing cryptographic signatures of the software is a guarantee? How do they prove it isn't keeping a copy of the code to make signatures from but actually running a malicious binary?
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3. HeatrayEnjoyer ◴[06 Nov 24 15:18 UTC] No.42063626[source]▶
How do you know the root enclave key isn't retained somewhere before it is written? You're still trusting Apple.

Key extraction is difficult but not impossible.

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4. jsheard ◴[06 Nov 24 15:22 UTC] No.42063692[source]▶
> Key extraction is difficult but not impossible.

Refer to the never-ending clown show that is Intels SGX enclave for examples of this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#List...

5. hnaccount_rng ◴[06 Nov 24 16:48 UTC] No.42065085[source]▶
But since they also control the phone's operating system they can just make it lie to you!

That doesn't make PCC useless by the way. It clearly establishes that Apple mislead customers, if there is any intentionality in a breach, or that Apple was negligent, if they do not immediately provide remedies on notification of a breach. But that's much more a "raising the cost" kind of thing and not a technical exclusion. Yes if you get Apple, as an organisation, to want to get at your data. And you use an iPhone. They absolutely can.

6. dialup_sounds ◴[06 Nov 24 16:51 UTC] No.42065128[source]▶
The client will only talk to servers that can prove they're running the same software as the published signatures.

https://security.apple.com/documentation/private-cloud-compu...

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7. warkdarrior ◴[06 Nov 24 17:43 UTC] No.42066073{3}[source]▶
And the servers prove that by relying on a key stored in secure hardware. And that secure hardware is designed by Apple, who has a specific interest in convincing users of that attestation/proof. Do you see the conflict of interest now?
8. yalogin ◴[06 Nov 24 18:53 UTC] No.42067336[source]▶
Can you clarify what you mean by retained and written?