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Stop Breaking TLS

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174 points todsacerdoti | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.2s | source
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parliament32 ◴[] No.46234605[source]
The author is complaining a lot about implementation pains without taking a step back and looking at why it exists in the first place.

Say you work at a place that deals with credit cards. You, as a security engineer, have a mandate to stop employees from shipping CC numbers outside the org.

You can educate all you want, you can have scary policies and HR buy-in, you can have all the "Anomaly detection, Zero Trust network architecture, EDR, Netflow analysis" in the world, but exactly zero of those will stop Joe Lunchbox from copy/pasting a block with a CC number in the middle into ChatGPT. You know what will? A TLS-inspecting proxy with some DLP bits and bobs.

It sucks, yes. But it works, and (short of the fool's errand of trying to whitelist every site any employee needs) it's the only thing that works.

And yes, I'm aware PCI DSS has additional requirements for CDEs and whatnot, but really this can apply to anything -- a local government office dealing with SSNs, a school with student ID numbers, a corporation with trade secrets.. these problems exist everywhere, and implementing PCI-like controls is often a bridge too far for unregulated industries.

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1. morpheuskafka ◴[] No.46242827[source]
> stop Joe Lunchbox from copy/pasting a block with a CC number in the middle into ChatGPT. You know what will? A TLS-inspecting proxy with some DLP bits and bobs.

If you are sniffing web traffic for anything that looks like a credit card number, won't you just catch every time the employee/company's own card is entered onto a payment page?