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Google is killing the open web, part 2

(wok.oblomov.eu)
418 points akagusu | 2 comments | 17 Nov 25 15:41 UTC | HN request time: 0.427s | source
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nwellnhof ◴[17 Nov 25 16:33 UTC] No.45955183[source]▶
Removing XSLT from browsers was long overdue and I'm saying that as ex-maintainer of libxslt who probably triggered (not caused) this removal. What's more interesting is that Chromium plans to switch to a Rust-based XML parser. Currently, they seem to favor xml-rs which only implements a subset of XML. So apparently, Google is willing to remove standards-compliant XML support as well. This is a lot more concerning.
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zetafunction ◴[17 Nov 25 17:16 UTC] No.45955667[source]▶
https://issues.chromium.org/issues/451401343 tracks work needed in the upstream xml-rs repository, so it seems like the team is working on addressing issues that would affect standards compliance.

Disclaimer: I work on Chrome and have occasionally dabbled in libxml2/libxslt in the past, but I'm not directly involved in any of the current work.

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Ygg2 ◴[17 Nov 25 17:20 UTC] No.45955710[source]▶
Wait. They are going along with a XML parser that supports DOCTYPES? I get XSLT is ancient and full of exploits, but so is DOCTYPE. Literally poster boy for billion laughs attack (among other vectors).
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1. Mikhail_Edoshin ◴[17 Nov 25 18:22 UTC] No.45956321[source]▶
The billion laughs bug was fixed in libxml2 in 2008. (As far as I understand in .Net this bug was fixed in 2014 with .Net 4.5.2. In 2019 a bug similar to "billion laughs" was found in Go YAML parser although it was explicitly mentioned and forbidden by YAML specs. Among other products it affected Kubernetes.)

Other vectors probably mean a single vector: external entities, where a) you process untrusted XML on server and b) allow the processor to read external entities. This is not a bug, but early versions of XML processors may lack an option to disallow access to external entities. This also has been fixed.

XSLT has no exploits at all, that is no features that can be misused.

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2. Ygg2 ◴[18 Nov 25 09:35 UTC] No.45963101[source]▶
> Other vectors probably mean a single vector: external entities,

XXE injection (which comes in several flavors), remote DTD retrieval, and quadratic blowup (a sort of twin to the billion laughs attack).

You aren't wrong though. They all live in <!DOCTYPE definition. Hence, my puzzlement.

Why process it at all? If this is as security focused as Google claims, fill the DOCTYPE with molten tungsten and throw it into the Mariana Trench. The external entities definition makes XSLT look well designed in comparison.