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mikeyouse ◴[] No.45682307[source]
> Tim Rieser, former senior aide to Senator Leahy who wrote the 2011 amendment mandating information gathering, told the BBC the gateway's removal meant the State Department was "clearly ignoring the law".

We're in a really bad place... with a servile congress, it turns out there aren't really any laws constraining the executive branch. When everything relies on "independent IGs" for law enforcement inside executive branch departments, and the President can fire them all without consequence or oversight, then it turns out there is no law.

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softwaredoug ◴[] No.45683230[source]
TBH The Right in the US has such a structural advantage, that Congress's silence becomes de-facto acceptance. Congress choosing to not do oversight becomes a de-facto repeal of the law.

The only other option is to find someone with standing being harmed and sue. And that will take time to wind through the courts, with not great chances at SCOTUS.

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rayiner ◴[] No.45683312[source]
> Congress's silence becomes de-facto acceptance. Congress choosing to not do oversight becomes a de-factor repeal of the law.

Yes, but why is that surprising? If a majority of any legislature doesn't care to see a law enforced, they could vote to repeal the law anyway. It's only because of the artifice of the filibuster in the U.S. system that there's a meaningful difference between those two things.

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galangalalgol ◴[] No.45683562[source]
The difference is that uneven enforcement is the tool of autocrats. Ignoring the law breeds contempt for it. Madison said requiring a supermajority for normal legislation would poison democracy, and I think the modern usage filibuster has proven him correct. I hope the GOP ditches the whole thing, not just for continuing resolutions. The senate will no longer have any excuses for abdicating its responsibilities. Thrashing laws are a small price to pay. I do wish judicial appointments still required a supermajority.
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rayiner ◴[] No.45683665[source]
Picking and choosing which laws to enforce is baked into the concept of prosecutorial discretion. There is a reason the country’s prosecutor in chief is an elected position. It was understood to be a fundamentally political office even in Jefferson’s day: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/02/thomas-je...

I agree we should abolish the filibuster. It makes incremental changes difficult and fosters extremism.

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estearum ◴[] No.45684713[source]
That’s not true.

Prosecutorial discretion exists because the executive can always say they’re just prioritizing their limited resources.

They absolutely ARE NOT allowed to just say “I’m not enforcing this because I disagree with the law.”

They also absolutely ARE NOT allowed to say “I’m enforcing a specific law against Party X but not against Party Y because I’m exercising discretion and I just like X.” That’s why dismissal for selective or vindictive prosecution exists.

In principle, the Constitution is quite clear: the President SHALL take care that the laws be faithfully executed…

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1. rayiner ◴[] No.45684881[source]
> They absolutely ARE NOT allowed to just say “I’m not enforcing this because I disagree with the law.”

Prosecutors are allowed to do that and do so all the time: https://www.aei.org/articles/viewpoint-on-not-enforcing-the-... (“Indeed, the ability of prosecutors to pick and choose among offenses is part of the constitutional structure of our government, as the Supreme Court has held too many times to recount. President Jefferson refused to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts because he was convinced that they were unjust, and unconstitutional to boot. (In 1964 the Supreme Court vindicated him.) President Carter pardoned most selective service violators and halted further prosecutions. President Johnson’s Antitrust Division published antitrust guidelines that proclaimed a policy of not bringing suit against small mergers, even though the Supreme Court had held repeatedly that similar mergers were unlawful. Many state and local governments decline to prosecute small drug offenses, saving resources for bigger game.”).

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2. estearum ◴[] No.45685218[source]
Did you read the article you posted? The entire thing is about allocation of finite resources. You can read the original Antitrust enforcement policy and see that it lays out a system of prioritization which (surprise surprise), prioritizes larger monopolization efforts over smaller ones.

It does not say "we don't think small companies can behave monopolistically so we aren't enforcing the law on them."

President Jefferson did not come out and say he's not enforcing ASA because he disagreed with them. Instead, he (secretly) wrote a memo against them as VP, then as President let them expire and pardoned everyone convicted under them.

I will reiterate the plain language of the United States Constitution: [the President] SHALL take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

SHALL does not mean MAY or AT HIS DISCRETION or any such thing.

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3. rayiner ◴[] No.45689615[source]
> President Jefferson did not come out and say he's not enforcing ASA because he disagreed with them. Instead, he (secretly) wrote a memo against them as VP, then as President let them expire and pardoned everyone convicted under them.

He didn’t enforce the ASA because he disagreed with it, just like Jimmy Carter didn’t prosecute people for selective service violations because he disagreed with it. It wasn’t because the resources weren’t available to enforce those laws.

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4. estearum ◴[] No.45689778{3}[source]
You actually can’t know what their motivations were — which is the point.

For example, if Congress had appropriated funds specifically for doing those things, the executive would be obligated to do them, because it’d be unambiguous as to whether resources existed to do them.

This is again an absolutely unambiguous consequence of Congress’s Constitutional control of spending and of the Take Care Clause.

What you are describing is effectively a line-item veto, which doesn’t exist in the US.

So far all the evidence you’ve posted is actually evidence of my argument, not yours.

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5. rayiner ◴[] No.45690651{4}[source]
> You actually can’t know what their motivations were — which is the point.

But we know the motivation because Jefferson wrote it down. It wasn’t resource management, it was opposition to the law on principle.

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6. estearum ◴[] No.45694264{5}[source]
Why can't you find a record of him publicly saying so? If it's just an established check and balance in our system, why can't you produce evidence of him saying "I'm not enforcing this law because I disagree with it" in any forum in which he could be held accountable (or not accountable, per your theory) for that decision?

Here's why: because it's not!

Here's SCOTUS in Kendall v United States:

> To contend that the obligations imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution is a novel construction of the Constitution, and is entirely inadmissible.

> "This doctrine cannot receive the sanction of this Court. It would be vesting in the President a dispensing power which has no countenance for its support in any part of the Constitution, and is asserting a principle which, if carried out in its results to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the President with a power to control the legislation of Congress and paralyze the administration of justice."

> The result of the cases of McIntire v. Wood and McCluny v. Silliman clearly is that the [court's authority to command an officer of the United States] to perform a specific act required by a law of the United States is within the scope of the judicial powers of the United States under the Constitution"