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aftergibson ◴[] No.45385420[source]
A secure, optional digital ID could be useful. But not in today’s UK. Why? Because the state has already shown it can’t be trusted with our data.

- Snoopers’ Charter (Investigatory Powers Act 2016): ISPs must keep a year’s worth of records of which websites you visit. More than 40 agencies—from MI5 to the Welsh Ambulance Service—can request it. MI5 has already broken the rules and kept data it shouldn’t have.

- Encryption backdoors: Ministers can issue “Technical Capability Notices” to force tech firms to weaken or bypass end-to-end encryption.

- Online Safety Act: Expands content-scanning powers that experts warn could undermine privacy for everyone.

- Palantir deals: The government has given £1.5 billion+ in contracts to a US surveillance firm that builds predictive-policing tools and runs the NHS’s new Federated Data Platform. Many of those deals are secret.

- Wall-to-wall cameras: Millions of CCTV cameras already make the UK one of the most surveilled countries in the world.

A universal digital ID would plug straight into this ecosystem, creating an always-on, uniquely identified record of where you go and what you do. Even if paper or card options exist on paper, smartphone-based systems will dominate in practice, leaving those without phones excluded or coerced.

I’m not against digital identity in principle. But until the UK government proves it can protect basic privacy—by rolling back mass data retention, ending encryption backdoor demands, and enforcing genuine oversight—any national digital ID is a surveillance power-grab waiting to happen.

I'm certain it's worked well in other countries, but I have zero trust in the UK government to handle this responsibility.

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nostrademons ◴[] No.45390081[source]
I wonder if zkSTARKS could help here. Prove that the validity of a statement (like "I am a citizen that is authorized to receive benefits") without revealing your precise identity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-interactive_zero-knowledge...

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1. grues-dinner ◴[] No.45390819[source]
That's basically how the existing share code system works for non-citizens. You the worker ask the government for a share code. You provide that to the prospective employer and they can check that it is valid. The same or similar system can be used for driving license validity.

The digital ID is presumably (this is my pulling a guess from my rear end, but if I had to implement it, I'd use the existing system) an extension to cover citizens too. In fact, in principle of that's how it works, it will marginally improve privacy because current status quo is basically that citizens provide their passport to the employer to demonstrate right to work via citizenship.

I also assume that the universal use of a single system means that spot-checking any workers status becomes easier. Currently if police, say, to use a common example, stop a food delivery rider and ask for their right to work they can say they're a citizen and just don't have ID on them. The UK has long derided the idea of everyone being expected to have ID with them with phrases like "papieren bitte", but it does mean that the authorities basically cannot check working statuses unless there's a physical workplace they can raid. Which is a weakness app-platforms and many people without the right to work have figured out.

A cynic might think that that kind of problem sounds a lot like a problem the government could already have solved in several other ways, but by letting it fester might finally garner public acceptance for the universal ID system they've always wanted.