Less is safer: How Obsidian reduces the risk of supply chain attacks

Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault.

Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community, which in turn increases the attack surface significantly.

Or it could have a browser extension like manifest that declares all permissions used by the plugin, where attempting to access a permission that's not granted gets blocked.

Both of these approaches would've led to more real security to end users than "we have few third party dependencies".

But I haven't heard anyone talk like that in quite sometime (unless it's me parroting them). Which is quite unfortunate.

I think for example if someone from the old guard of Blizzard were to write a book or at least a novella that described how the plugin system for World of Warcraft functioned, particularly during the first ten years, where it broke, how they hardened it over time, and how the process worked of backporting features from plugins into the core library...

I think that would be a substantial net benefit to the greater software community.

Far too many ecosystems make ham-fisted, half-assed, hair-brained plugin systems. And the vast majority can be consistently described by at least two of the three.