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1208 points jamesberthoty | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.199s | source
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kafrofrite ◴[] No.45269081[source]
It's probably not trivial to implement and there's already a bunch of problems that need solving (e.g., trusting keys etc.) but... I think that if we had some sort of lightweight code provenance (on top of my head commits are signed from known/trusted keys, releases are signed by known keys, installing signed packages requires verification), we could probably make it somewhat harder to introduce malicious changes.

Edit: It looks like there's already something similar using sigstore in npm https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements#abou.... My understanding is that its use is not widespread though and it's mostly used to verify the publisher.

replies(1): >>45271467 #
1. yawaramin ◴[] No.45271467[source]
I think that depends on...how are these malicious changes actually getting into these packages? It seems very mysterious to me. I wonder why npm isn't being very forthcoming about this?