Man jailed for parole violations after refusing to decrypt his Tor node

For whatever it's worth, the Reddit story here says that the federal courts used "fraudulent warrants to jail my husband again". Maybe! The other side of that story, via PACER, is a detailed parole violation warrant (you can hear the marshal refer to it in the video); the violations in that warrant:

1. Admitting to using cannabis during supervised release

2. Failing to make scheduled restitution payments and to cooperate with the financial investigation that sets restitution payment amounts.

3. Falling out of contact with his probation officer, who attempted home visits to find him.

4. Opening several new lines of credit.

5. Using an unauthorized iPhone (all his Internet devices apparently have keyloggers as a condition of his release).

These read like kind of standard parole terms? I don't know what the hell happened to get him into this situation in the first place, though.

OK, I think I found the original thing Rockenhaus was convicted of.

Back in 2014, Rockenhaus worked for a travel booking company. He was fired. He used stale VPN access to connect back to the company's infrastructure, and then detached a SCSI LUN from the server cluster, crashing it. The company, not knowing he was involved, retained him to help diagnose and fix the problem. During the investigation, the company figured out he caused the crash, and terminated him again. He then somehow gained access to their disaster recovery facility and physically fucked up a bunch of servers. They were down a total of about 30 days and incurred $500k in losses.

(He plead this case out, so these are I guess uncontested claims).

If all of that is true, then that is a very serious CFAA charge. It makes sense that they would want to downplay it as "minor" and "not relevant". It sounds like the parole violations came later? In any case, thank you for researching. There is always more to the story.

Weev 'violated' the CFAA for incrementing a GET request, with his overturned conviction only for wrong jurisdiction. So the government has put us in a position where it's hard to take the CFAA seriously.

We also know from prosecutions in other statutes that the government will often prosecute a a broad crime with many separate sub-definitions of the various way you can break it, then refuse to tell you under which sub-definition you're being charged, meaning you have no way to know if the jury even were unanimously convicting for the same thing and no way to know what you're even defending against.

> We also know from prosecutions in other statutes that the government will often prosecute a a broad crime with many separate sub-definitions of the various way you can break it, then refuse to tell you under which sub-definition you're being charged, meaning you have no way to know if the jury even were unanimously convicting for the same thing and no way to know what you're even defending against.

Could you give some examples of this?

Yes, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63291773/united-states-....

Navy sailor was convicted of possessing machine guns and destructive devices.

The ATF for example put back together de-milled RPGs, which could be a destructive device

However the statute says the following:

   (2) any type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes; and (3) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled.

The ATF took his demilled RPG, put another gun (owned by the ATF) inside of it, then fired it to prove it had a bore over 0.5 inch capable of expelling projectile.

But the state didn't tell him under what definition he was charged, so they didn't know if they were defending against the collection of parts the ATF took (falls under 3), or against the weapon the ATF claimed it was after they put the parts together (which falls under 2).

Thanks for the reference! For the convenience of anyone else reading, the appeals docket is at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67566242/united-states-.... Note that there are two appeals briefs; it seems the defendant replaced their attorney at some point during the appeals process.

For what it's worth, I think this is the government's response to the argument you raise (on page 22 of the response brief, PDF page 30):

> Section 5845, captioned “[d]efinitions,” is a definitional provision, not a criminal prohibition. As relevant here, § 5845(b) defines the term “machinegun,” and § 5845(f) defines the term “destructive device.” These definitions do not create additional elements of the offenses charged under §§ 5861(d) and 922(o). Therefore, the government was not required to charge the applicable definition(s) in the indictment. See, e.g., Robbins, 476 F.2d at 30 (holding that an indictment under § 5861(d) need not refer to the definitions in § 5845 to “fairly notify a defendant of the charge against him”); United States v. Hoover, 635 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (rejecting the argument that the government “was required to plead the specific facts supporting its contention that the [firearms] at issue fall within the definition of a machinegun”); cf. United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The indictment’s failure to cite [18 U.S.C.] § 1346, a definitional provision, and to use its specific term, ‘honest’ services, does not mean no crime was charged.”).

And defendant's response, page 5:

> The question is whether the indictment “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished” and whether the indictment complied “with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case” within the intent of the statute. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1881) (emphasis added). The government’s failure to give any specificity in the indictment cannot be remedied by wriggling as to whether the missing information can be considered an “element” or not. Even if the government were correct that the particular definition (or definitions) the prosecution is proceeding under does not change “elements,” it changes the “facts” underlying the scope of the statute.

I have no idea who is correct legally, and since oral arguments appear to have been held a few days ago I suppose I'll have to wait to see who is right.