These attacks may just be the final push I needed to take server rendering (without js) more seriously. The HTMX folks convinced me that I can get REALLY far without any JavaScript, and my apps will probably be faster and less janky anyway.
Socket:
- Sep 15 (First post on breach): https://socket.dev/blog/tinycolor-supply-chain-attack-affect...
- Sep 16: https://socket.dev/blog/ongoing-supply-chain-attack-targets-...
StepSecurity – https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/ctrl-tinycolor-and-40-npm-p...
Aikido - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/s1ngularity-nx-attackers-strike-...
Ox - https://www.ox.security/blog/npm-2-0-hack-40-npm-packages-hi...
Safety - https://www.getsafety.com/blog-posts/shai-hulud-npm-attack
Phoenix - https://phoenix.security/npm-tinycolor-compromise/
Semgrep - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/security-advisory-npm-packages...
These attacks may just be the final push I needed to take server rendering (without js) more seriously. The HTMX folks convinced me that I can get REALLY far without any JavaScript, and my apps will probably be faster and less janky anyway.
I see this odd take a lot - the automatic narrowing of the scope of an attack to the single ecosystem it occurred in most recently, without any real technical argument for doing so.
What's especially concerning is I see this take in the security industry: mitigations put in place to target e.g. NPM, but are then completely absent for PyPi or Crates. It's bizarre not only because it leaves those ecosystems wide open, but also because the mitigation measures would be very similar (so it would be a minimal amount of additional effort for a large benefit).
But don't brush off "special status" of NPM here. It is unique in that JS being language of both front-end and back-end, it is much easier for the crooks to sneak in malware that will end up running in visitor's browser and affect them directly. And that makes it a uniquely more attractive target.
1- thoroughly and fully analyze any dependency tree you plan to include 2- immediately freeze all its versions 3- never update without very good reason or without repeating 1 and 2
in other words: simply be professional, face logical consequences if you aren't. if you think one package manager is "safer" than others because magic reasons odds are you'll find out the hard way sooner or later.
I'm in the C ecosystem mostly. Is one NPM package the equivalent of one object file? Can NPM packages call internal functions for their dependencies instead of relying so heavily on bringing in so many external ones? I guess it's a problem either way, internal dependencies having bugs vs supply chain attacks like these. Doesn't bringing in so many dependencies lead to a lot of dead code and much larger codebases then necessary?
No. The closest thing to a package (on almost every language) is an entire library.
> Can NPM packages call internal functions for their dependencies instead of relying so heavily on bringing in so many external ones?
Yes, they can. They just don't do it.
> Doesn't bringing in so many dependencies lead to a lot of dead code and much larger codebases then necessary?
There aren't many unecessary dependencies, because the number of direct dependencies on each package is reasonable (on the order of 10). And you don't get a lot of unecessary code because the point of tiny libraries is to only import what you need.
Dead code is not the problem, instead the JS mentality evolved that way to minimize dead code. The problem is that dead code is actually not that much of an issue, but dependency management is.
personally i keep dependencies at a minimum and are very picky with them, partly because of nr1, but as a general principle. of course if people happily suck in entire trees without supervision just to print ansi colors on the terminal or, as in this case, use fancy aliases for colors then bad things are bound to happen. (tbf tinycolor has one single devDependency, shim-deno-test, which only requires typescript. that should be manageable)
i'll grant you that the js ecosystem is special, partly because the business has traditionally reinforced the notion of it being accessory, superficial and not "serious" development. well, that's just naivety, it is as critical a component as any other. ideally you should even have a security department vetting the dependencies for you.