Socket:
- Sep 15 (First post on breach): https://socket.dev/blog/tinycolor-supply-chain-attack-affect...
- Sep 16: https://socket.dev/blog/ongoing-supply-chain-attack-targets-...
StepSecurity – https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/ctrl-tinycolor-and-40-npm-p...
Aikido - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/s1ngularity-nx-attackers-strike-...
Ox - https://www.ox.security/blog/npm-2-0-hack-40-npm-packages-hi...
Safety - https://www.getsafety.com/blog-posts/shai-hulud-npm-attack
Phoenix - https://phoenix.security/npm-tinycolor-compromise/
Semgrep - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/security-advisory-npm-packages...
These attacks may just be the final push I needed to take server rendering (without js) more seriously. The HTMX folks convinced me that I can get REALLY far without any JavaScript, and my apps will probably be faster and less janky anyway.
Supply chain attacks happen at every layer where there is package management or a vector onto the machine or into the code.
What NPM should do if they really give a shit is start requiring 2FA to publish. Require a scan prior to publish. Sign the package with hard keys and signature. Verify all packages installed match signatures. Semver matching isn’t enough. CRC checks aren’t enough. This has to be baked into packages and package management.
While technically true, I have yet to see Go projects importing thousands of dependencies. They may certainly exist, but are absolutely not the rule. JS projects, however...
We have to realize, that while supply chain attacks can happen everywhere, the best mitigations are development culture and solid standard library - looking at you, cargo.
I am a JS developer by trade and I think that this ecosystem is doomed. I absolutely avoid even installing node on my private machine.
NPM has also been sending out nag emails for the last 2+ years about 2FA. If anything, that constituted an assist in the attack on the Junon account that we saw a couple weeks ago.
That is, if some attacker create some dummy trivial but convenient package and 2 years latter half the package hub depends on it somehow, the attacker will just use its legit credential to pown everyone and its dog. This is not even about stilling credentials. It’s a cultural issue with bare blind trust to use blank check without even any expiry date.
Assuming 'go mod tidy' is periodically run go.mod should contain all dependencies (which in this case seems to be shy of 300, still a lot).
That's really the core issue. Developer-signed packages (npm's current attack model is "Eve doing a man-in-the-middle attack between npm and you," which is not exactly the most common threat here) and a transparent key registry should be minimal kit for any package manager, even though all, or at least practically all, the ecosystems are bereft of that. Hardening API surfaces with additional MFA isn't enough; you have to divorce "API authentication" from "cryptographic authentication" so that compromising one doesn't affect the other.
<https://docs.npmjs.com/configuring-two-factor-authentication...>
As another subthread mentioned (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45261303), there is something which can be done: auditing of new packages or versions, by a third party, before they're used. Even doing a simple diff between the previous version and the current version before running anything within the package would already help.
How does 2FA prevent malware? Anyone can get a phone number to receive a text or add an authenticator to their phone.
I would argue a subscrption model for 1 EUR/month would be better. The money received could pay for certification of packages and the credit card on file can leverage the security of the payments system.
https://github.blog/changelog/2022-11-01-high-impact-package...
In a hypothetical scenario where npm supports signed packages, let's say the user is in the middle of installing the latest signed left-pad. Suddenly, npm prints a warning that says the identity used to sign the package is not in the user's local database of trusted identities.
What exactly is the user supposed to do in response to this warning?
Now imagine you're another developer who needs to install a specific NPM package published by someone overseas who has zero vouches by anyone in your web of trust. What exactly are you going to do?
In reality, forcing package publishers to sign packages would achieve absolutely nothing. 99.99 % of package consumers would not even bother to even begin building a web of trust, and just blindly trust any signature.
The remaining 0.01 % who actually try are either going to fail to gain any meaningful access to a WoT, or they're going to learn that most identities of package publishers are completely unreachable via any WoT whatsoever.