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1369 points universesquid | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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junon ◴[] No.45169794[source]
Hi, yep I got pwned. Sorry everyone, very embarrassing.

More info:

- https://github.com/chalk/chalk/issues/656

- https://github.com/debug-js/debug/issues/1005#issuecomment-3...

Affected packages (at least the ones I know of):

- ansi-styles@6.2.2

- debug@4.4.2 (appears to have been yanked as of 8 Sep 18:09 CEST)

- chalk@5.6.1

- supports-color@10.2.1

- strip-ansi@7.1.1

- ansi-regex@6.2.1

- wrap-ansi@9.0.1

- color-convert@3.1.1

- color-name@2.0.1

- is-arrayish@0.3.3

- slice-ansi@7.1.1

- color@5.0.1

- color-string@2.1.1

- simple-swizzle@0.2.3

- supports-hyperlinks@4.1.1

- has-ansi@6.0.1

- chalk-template@1.1.1

- backslash@0.2.1

It looks and feels a bit like a targeted attack.

Will try to keep this comment updated as long as I can before the edit expires.

---

Chalk has been published over. The others remain compromised (8 Sep 17:50 CEST).

NPM has yet to get back to me. My NPM account is entirely unreachable; forgot password system does not work. I have no recourse right now but to wait.

Email came from support at npmjs dot help.

Looked legitimate at first glance. Not making excuses, just had a long week and a panicky morning and was just trying to knock something off my list of to-dos. Made the mistake of clicking the link instead of going directly to the site like I normally would (since I was mobile).

Just NPM is affected. Updates to be posted to the `/debug-js` link above.

Again, I'm so sorry.

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cataflam ◴[] No.45175160[source]
Hey, you're doing an exemplary response, transparent and fast, in what must be a very stressful situation!

I figure you aren't about to get fooled by phishing anytime soon, but based on some of your remarks and remarks of others, a PSA:

TRUSTING YOUR OWN SENSES to "check" that a domain is right, or an email is right, or the wording has some urgency or whatever is BOUND TO FAIL often enough.

I don't understand how most of the anti-phishing advice focuses on that, it's useless to borderline counter-productive.

What really helps against phishing :

1. NEVER EVER login from an email link. EVER. There are enough legit and phishing emails asking you to do this that it's basically impossible to tell one from the other. The only way to win is to not try.

2. U2F/Webauthn key as second factor is phishing-proof. TOTP is not.

That is all there is. Any other method, any other "indicator" helps but is error-prone, which means someone somewhere will get phished eventually. Particularly if stressed, tired, or in a hurry. It just happened to be you this time.

Good luck and well done again on the response!

replies(2): >>45175512 #>>45186585 #
graemep ◴[] No.45186585[source]
> NEVER EVER login from an email link. EVER

Login using one off email links (instead of username + password) is increasingly common which means its the only option.

replies(2): >>45187240 #>>45190350 #
hirako2000 ◴[] No.45187240[source]
At least you've requested that email, to be able to login. The timing chance for a phishing mail to come here and there is insignificant. OP is referring to communications that are one way street, the (pseudo) organisation to you.
replies(1): >>45189409 #
graemep ◴[] No.45189409[source]
Its a lot lower risk, its still not great IMO. Email is really not designed for it, and it trains people to use links to login.
replies(2): >>45190179 #>>45193326 #
danenania ◴[] No.45193326[source]
Username/password typically has the same issue via reset password links.
replies(1): >>45195620 #
1. graemep ◴[] No.45195620{3}[source]
I agree. However you use them less often, so its far harder for someone to time it right.

If you use username instead of email address attackers have to guess that too.

One quite serious problem I see quite often is using email plus password for login, and notifying on failed login that the email is not in the system, letting attackers validate which emails are logins.

replies(1): >>45202237 #
2. danenania ◴[] No.45202237[source]
It happens less often, but it's also more believable that it would be sent without a user action—e.g. "We had a security incident. Please click here to change your password."

And this is exactly the kind of phishing attack that is most effective, as this particular incident shows. So I'd say it's actually a worse phishing vector than magic links.