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Memory Integrity Enforcement

(security.apple.com)
461 points circuit | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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randyrand ◴[] No.45189525[source]
> There has never been a successful, widespread malware attack against iPhone. The only system-level iOS attacks we observe in the wild come from mercenary spyware ... to target a very small number of specific individuals and their devices. Although the vast majority of users will never be targeted in this way..

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the spyware that has been developed certainly could be applied at scale at the push of a button with basic modification. They just have chosen not to at this time. I feel like this paragraph is drawing a bigger distinction than actually exists.

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strcat ◴[] No.45189878[source]
Neither Apple or Google truly knows how widespread attacks on their products have been despite portraying it as if they have perfect insight into it. They're claiming to know something they cannot. GrapheneOS has published leaked data from exploit developers showing they're much more successful at exploiting devices and keeping up with updates than most people believe. We have access to more than what we've published, since we don't publish it without multiple independent sources to avoid leaks being identified. These tools are widely available, and it cannot be generally known when they're used whether it's data extraction or remote exploitation. Catching exploits in the wild is the exception to the rule, otherwise exploit development companies would have a much harder job needing to keep making new exploits after they're heavily used. They wouldn't value a single exploit chain nearly as much as they do if it stopped working after it was used 50k times. Law enforcement around the world has access to tools like Cellebrite Premium which are used against many people crossing borders, at protests, etc. That is usage at scale. There's far less insight into remote exploits which don't have to be distributed broadly to be broadly used.
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1. bigiain ◴[] No.45190900[source]
> tools like Cellebrite Premium which are used against many people crossing borders

I wonder when the first person will be turned away from a US border for having an iPhone Air that the CBPs phone extraction tool doesn't work on?