NPM debug and chalk packages compromised

Hi, yep I got pwned. Sorry everyone, very embarrassing.

More info:

- https://github.com/chalk/chalk/issues/656

- https://github.com/debug-js/debug/issues/1005#issuecomment-3...

Affected packages (at least the ones I know of):

- ansi-styles@6.2.2

- debug@4.4.2 (appears to have been yanked as of 8 Sep 18:09 CEST)

- chalk@5.6.1

- supports-color@10.2.1

- strip-ansi@7.1.1

- ansi-regex@6.2.1

- wrap-ansi@9.0.1

- color-convert@3.1.1

- color-name@2.0.1

- is-arrayish@0.3.3

- slice-ansi@7.1.1

- color@5.0.1

- color-string@2.1.1

- simple-swizzle@0.2.3

- supports-hyperlinks@4.1.1

- has-ansi@6.0.1

- chalk-template@1.1.1

- backslash@0.2.1

It looks and feels a bit like a targeted attack.

Will try to keep this comment updated as long as I can before the edit expires.

---

Chalk has been published over. The others remain compromised (8 Sep 17:50 CEST).

NPM has yet to get back to me. My NPM account is entirely unreachable; forgot password system does not work. I have no recourse right now but to wait.

Email came from support at npmjs dot help.

Looked legitimate at first glance. Not making excuses, just had a long week and a panicky morning and was just trying to knock something off my list of to-dos. Made the mistake of clicking the link instead of going directly to the site like I normally would (since I was mobile).

Just NPM is affected. Updates to be posted to the `/debug-js` link above.

Again, I'm so sorry.

What did the phishing email say that made you click and login?

That it had been more than 12 months since last updating them. Npm has done outreach before about doing security changes/enhancements in the past so this didn't really catch me.

Screenshot here: https://imgur.com/a/q8s235k

@everyone in the industry, everywhere:

Urgency is poison.

Please, please put a foot in the door whenever you see anyone trying to push this kind of sh*t on your users. Make one month's advance notice the golden standard.

I see this pattern in scam mail (including physical) all the time: stamp an unreasonably short notice and expect the mark to panic. This scam works - and this is why legit companies that try this "in good faith" should be shamed for doing it.

Actual alerts: just notify. Take immediate, preventive, but non-destructive action, and help the user figure out how to right it - on their own terms.

Agree, but this example wasn’t even that aggressive in its urgency and op said they were merely ticking things off the todo, not feeling alarmed by the urgency. The problem is email as it’s used currently. The solution is to not use email.

> The problem is email as it’s used currently. The solution is to not use email.

No. The problem is unsigned package repositories.

The solution is to tie a package to an identity using a certificate. Quickest way I can think off would be requiring packages to be linked to a domain so that the repository can always check incoming changes to packages using the incoming signature against the domain certificate.

That wouldn't work against a really sophisticated attacker. Especially for something that's clearly being maintained for free by one overworked person in their spare time (yet again).

You'd need some kind of offline verification method as well for these widely used infrastructure libraries.

> That wouldn't work against a really sophisticated attacker.

Nothing "really works" against a sophisticated hacker :-/ Doesn't mean that "defense in depth" does not apply.

> You'd need some kind of offline verification method as well for these widely used infrastructure libraries.

I don't understand why this is an issue, or even what it means: uploading a new package to the repository requires the contributor to be online anyway. The new/updated/replacement package will have to be signed. The signature must be verified by the upload script/handler. The verification can be done using the X509 certificate issued for the domain of the contributor.

1. If the contributor cannot afford the few dollars a year for a domain, they are extremely vulnerable to the supply chain attack anyway (by selling the maintenance of the package to a bad actor), and you shouldn't trust them anyway.

2. If the contributor's domain gets compromised you only have to revoke that specific certificate, and all packages signed with that certificate, in the past or in the future, would not be installable.

As I have repeatedly said in the past, NPM (and the JS tools development community in general) had no adults in the room during the design phase. Everything about JS stacks feels like it was designed by children who had never programmed in anything else before.

It's a total clown show.