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988 points keyboardJones | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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ktosobcy ◴[] No.45172164[source]
> In the past, if you broke or lost your phone, your Signal message history was gone.

this and completly useless multi-device support is the reason I don't use Signal... Telegram is not fully e2ee but it's way more convenient here.

Even XMPP with PGP would be lightyears ahead.

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maqp ◴[] No.45172502[source]
>"Telegram is not fully e2ee but it's way more convenient here."

Yeah convenient way to hand your data to a Russian oligarch.

PGP has no forward secrecy and OTR in XMPP lacks future secrecy, multi-device support etc.

Signal introducing end-to-end encrypted backups is exactly how Telegram should've done it decade ago.

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upofadown ◴[] No.45176475[source]
Future secrecy?

PGP does multirecipients natively, so any restrictions there would be in the XMPP client.

I have actually tried out PGP over XMPP and is was nice once it was set up. Absolutely no state. If the message somehow gets to you it just works. Sucked when the keys expired though:

* https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:expire

PGP support on XMPP isn't really that great. Forward secrecy might be a nice addition, even if it was semi-manual. There are compatibility problems between clients for encrypted media. You don't end up with an always encrypted archive like you do with email, but that could be considered an inherent weakness of instant messaging...

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maqp ◴[] No.45177652[source]
>Future secrecy?

Meaning --if-- when your keys get compromised the system recovers.

PGP lacks even forward secrecy, meaning key compromise alone allows retrospective decryption of every message you've ever sent.

OTR fixed that in... ...2004 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1029179.1029200

Using PGP for secure communication in 2025 when you have option to use stateful E2EE over stuff like Signal is just bonkers.

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1. upofadown ◴[] No.45180402[source]
If your keys get compromised then you would need new keys in any case.

I think that the sort of people that use PGP are more interested in not having any messages compromised, ever, while still retaining access to their old messages in a secure way. Contrast that with, say, Signal where a forensic tool like Cellebrite will allow access to retained Signal messages[1]. Sure, most of that is due to the inherent insecurity of encrypted instant messaging over, say, encrypted email, but the users in the end don't care. They just want to be able to communicate privately.

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20201210150311/https://www.celle...