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What is it like to be a bat?

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180 points adityaathalye | 2 comments | 03 Sep 25 17:48 UTC | HN request time: 0.405s | source
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bondarchuk ◴[03 Sep 25 19:34 UTC] No.45119634[source]▶
>"An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism."

IMHO the phrasing here is essential to the argument and this phrasing contains a fundamental error. In valid usage we only say that two things are like one another when they are also separate things. The usage here (which is cleverly hidden in some tortured language) implies that there is a "thing" that is "like" "being the organism", yet is distinct from "being the organism". This is false - there is only "being the organism", there is no second "thing that is like being the organism" not even for the organism itself.

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sethev ◴[04 Sep 25 00:48 UTC] No.45122150[source]▶
That particular phrasing happened to catch on, but I don't think it's essential to any of the arguments. How would you phrase the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't? Or are you saying that that distinction is just a verbal trick?
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bondarchuk ◴[04 Sep 25 11:32 UTC] No.45126092[source]▶
>How would you phrase the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't?

You just did! Why would we need to rephrase this and then attach special importance to that new sentence construction, when "the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't" is perfectly adequate?

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1. sethev ◴[04 Sep 25 14:13 UTC] No.45127505[source]▶
That's just a label, though, it makes no attempt to describe the difference. You could say a conscious object has subjective experience, but that's open to the same observation that it implies there are two things (the subject and the experience).
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2. bondarchuk ◴[05 Sep 25 15:23 UTC] No.45139634[source]▶
I can only use a label to vaguely point at the concept of consciousness, and thus the disctinction between conscious and non-conscious objects. This is not infinitely precise, because noone really understands what's going on. What you call "describing the difference" would in fact be making further claims about consciousness. If one is not in the position of making further claims, it is better to not make any claims and stick to vague but commonly understood labels, instead of making claims implicitly by using complicated labels without further examination.