←back to thread

What is it like to be a bat?

(en.wikipedia.org)
180 points adityaathalye | 1 comments | 03 Sep 25 17:48 UTC | HN request time: 0.2s | source
Show context
bondarchuk ◴[03 Sep 25 19:34 UTC] No.45119634[source]▶
>"An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism."

IMHO the phrasing here is essential to the argument and this phrasing contains a fundamental error. In valid usage we only say that two things are like one another when they are also separate things. The usage here (which is cleverly hidden in some tortured language) implies that there is a "thing" that is "like" "being the organism", yet is distinct from "being the organism". This is false - there is only "being the organism", there is no second "thing that is like being the organism" not even for the organism itself.

replies(10): >>45119712 #>>45119753 #>>45119822 #>>45119986 #>>45120638 #>>45120656 #>>45121170 #>>45121415 #>>45122150 #>>45126086 #
mtlmtlmtlmtl ◴[03 Sep 25 20:00 UTC] No.45119822[source]▶
This is the conclusion I come to whenever I try to grasp the works of Nagel, Chalmers, Goff, Searle et al. They're just linguistically chasing their own tails. There's no meaningful insight below it all. All of their arguments, however complex, all rely on poorly defined terms like "understand" "subjective experience", "what it is like", "qualia", etc. And when you try to understand the arguments with the definition of these terms left open, you realise the arguments only make sense when the terms include in their definition a supposition that the argument is true. It's all just circular reasoning.
replies(7): >>45120025 #>>45120501 #>>45120544 #>>45120703 #>>45121244 #>>45122171 #>>45123878 #
mellosouls ◴[03 Sep 25 20:25 UTC] No.45120025[source]▶
All of their arguments, however complex, all rely on poorly defined terms like "understand" "subjective experience", "what it is like", "qualia", etc.

Because they are trying to discuss a difficult-to-define concept - consciousness.

The difficulty and nebulousness is intrinsic to the subject, especially when trying to discuss in scientific terms.

To dismiss their attempts so, you have to counter with a crystal, unarguable description of what consciousness actually is.

Which of course, you cannot do, as there is no such agreed description.

replies(3): >>45120832 #>>45121258 #>>45121286 #
cwmoore ◴[03 Sep 25 21:59 UTC] No.45120832[source]▶
“The Feeling of What Happens” by Antonio D’Amasio, a book by a neuroscientist some years ago [0], does an excellent job of building a framework for conscious sensation from the parts, as I recall, constructing a theory of “mind maps” from various nervous system structures that impressed me with a sense that I could afterwards understand them.

[0] https://www.labyrinthbooks.com/the-feeling-of-what-happens/

replies(1): >>45121220 #
brudgers ◴[03 Sep 25 22:50 UTC] No.45121220[source]▶
As a radical materialist, the problem with ordinary materialism is that it boils down to dualism because some types matter (e.g. the human nervous system) give rise to consciousness and other types of matter (e.g. human bones) do not.

Ordinary materialism is mind-body/soul-substance subjectivity with a hat and lipstick.

replies(3): >>45121533 #>>45121616 #>>45125156 #
1. GoblinSlayer ◴[04 Sep 25 09:00 UTC] No.45125156[source]▶
Nervous system and bones work differently, because they have different structure, that's materialism alright.