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What is it like to be a bat?

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180 points adityaathalye | 2 comments | 03 Sep 25 17:48 UTC | HN request time: 0.427s | source
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wagwang ◴[03 Sep 25 19:22 UTC] No.45119516[source]▶
Can we just all admit there has basically been no real progress made to the mind-body problem. They all rest on metaphysical axioms of which no one has any proof of. Physicalism is about as plausible as solipsism.

Exhibit a

> Nagel begins by assuming that "conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon" present in many animals (particularly mammals), even though it is "difficult to say [...] what provides evidence of it".

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jibal ◴[03 Sep 25 19:59 UTC] No.45119812[source]▶
> Physicalism is about as plausible as solipsism.

Physicalism is an ontological assertion that is almost certainly true, and is adhered to by nearly all scientists and most philosophers of mind. Solipsism is an ontological assertion that could only possibly be true for one person, and is generally dismissed. They are at opposite ends of the plausibility scale.

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1. wagwang ◴[03 Sep 25 21:30 UTC] No.45120621[source]▶
I've never heard any argument that demonstrates any certainty around physicalism. I like the argument bcuz it sounds nice, but I would never ever claim to know it to be true. I mostly arrived at physicalism because there are eggregious problems with the other theories and physicalism seemed like the suitable default naive answer.
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2. jibal ◴[03 Sep 25 22:20 UTC] No.45120995[source]▶
You might want to look at https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/46w6qp/comme...

and

https://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/NoM%20-%205.p...