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201 points sdsantos | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.238s | source
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Terr_ ◴[] No.45118328[source]
I'd like to point out that a regime may find it worthwhile to compromise more kinds/sizes of VPNs than we might expect.

The evil regime doesn't need to have a popular evil VPN that everybody uses... it may be enough to operate (or hack) a smaller VPN which can unmask enough dissidents that their friend-groups can be found by other means.

replies(1): >>45119093 #
1. 01HNNWZ0MV43FF ◴[] No.45119093[source]
That threat model for Signal worries me.

If I was the US government, I'd push Google Play to offer compromised updates of Signal silently to a few people I was interested in. Even among the highly-technical, who is going to be inspecting binaries installed on a phone regularly?

Does Signal even have reproducible builds? How do I know the code matches the binary?

I'd make my own messenger.... but I don't have the money for that at all.

I wish these risks could be split up and handled separately - Suppose I run a private dark network for me and my friends, and then the GUI for chatting over it runs in a sandbox where it can only message servers that I control, using public/private keys that I control.

Conflating a million lines of Java GUI code with "Noise is a simple and secure protocol" seems like a big attack surface.