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betaby ◴[] No.45076609[source]
The sad part, that despite the years of the development BTRS never reached the parity with ZFS. And yesterday's news "Josef Bacik who is a long-time Btrfs developer and active co-maintainer alongside David Sterba is leaving Meta. Additionally, he's also stepping back from Linux kernel development as his primary job." see https://www.phoronix.com/news/Josef-Bacik-Leaves-Meta

There is no 'modern' ZFS-like fs in Linux nowadays.

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tw04 ◴[] No.45080011[source]
There's literally ZFS-on-linux and it works great. And yes, I will once again say Linus is completely wrong about ZFS and the multiple times he's spoken about it, it's abundantly clear he's never used it or bothered to spend any time researching its features and functionality.

https://zfsonlinux.org/

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koverstreet ◴[] No.45080220[source]
ZFS deserves an absolutely legendary amount of respect for showing us all what a modern filesystem should be - the papers they wrote, alone, did the entire filesystem world such a massive service by demonstrating the possibilities of full data integrity and why we want it, and then they showed it could be done.

But there's a ton of room for improvement beyond what ZFS did. ZFS was a very conservative design in a lot of ways (rightly so! so many ambitious projects die because of second system syndrome); notably, it's block based and doesn't do extents - extents and snapshots are a painfully difficult combination.

Took me years to figure that one out.

My hope for bcachefs has always been to be a real successor to ZFS, with better and more flexible management, better performance, and even better robustness and reliability.

Long road, but the work continues.

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TheAceOfHearts ◴[] No.45080462[source]
> But there's a ton of room for improvement beyond what ZFS did.

Say more? I can't say I've really thought that much about filesystems and I'm curious in what direction you think they could be taken if time and budget weren't an issue.

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koverstreet ◴[] No.45080669[source]
that would be bcachefs :)

It's an entirely clean slate design, and I spent years taking my time on the core planning out the design; it's as close to perfect as I can make it.

The only things I can think of that I would change or add given unlimited time and budget: - It should be written in Rust, and even better a Rust + dependent types (which I suspect could be done with proc macros) for formal verification. And cap'n proto for on disk data structures (which still needs Rust improvements to be as ergonomic as it should be) would also be a really nice improvement.

- More hardening; the only other thing we're lacking is comprehensive fault injection testing of on disk errors. It's sufficiently battle hardened that it's not a major gap, but it really should happen at some point.

- There's more work to be done in bitrot prevention: data checksums really need to be plumbed all the way into the pagecache

I'm sure we'll keep discovering new small ways to harden, but nothing huge at this point.

Some highlights: - It has more defense in depth than any filesystem I know of. It's as close to impossible to have unrecoverable data loss as I think can really be done in a practical production filesystem - short of going full immutable/append only.

- Closest realization of "filesystem as a database" that I know of

- IO path options (replication level, compression, etc.) can be set on a per file or directory basis: I'm midway through a project extending this to do some really cool stuff, basically data management is purely declarative.

- Erasure coding is much more performant than ZFS's

- Data layout is fully dynamic, meaning you can add/remove devices at will, it just does the right thing - meaning smoother device management than ZFS

- The way the repair code works, and tracking of errors we've seen - fantastic for debugability

- Debugability and introspection are second to none: long bug hunts really aren't a thing in bcachefs development because you can just see anything the system is doing

There's still lots of work to do before we're fully at parity with ZFS. Over the next year or two I should be finishing erasure coding, online fsck, failure domains, lots more management stuff... there will always be more cool projects just over the horizon

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nullc ◴[] No.45083071[source]
> - Erasure coding is much more performant than ZFS's

any plans for much lower rates than typical raid?

Increasingly modern high density devices are having block level failures at non-trivial rates instead of or in addition to whole device failures. A file might be 100,000 blocks long, adding 1000 blocks of FEC would expand it 1% but add tremendous protection against block errors. And can do so even if you have a single piece of media. Doesn't protect against device failures, sure, though without good block level protection device level protection is dicey since hitting some block level error when down to minimal devices seems inevitable and having to add more and more redundant devices is quite costly.

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koverstreet ◴[] No.45083444[source]
It's been talked about. I've seen some interesting work to use just a normal checksum to correct single bit errors.

If there's an optimized implementation we can use in the kernel, I'd love to add it. Even on modern hardware, we do see bit corruption in the wild, it would add real value.

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nullc ◴[] No.45083475[source]
It's pretty straight forward to use a normal checksum to correct single or even more bit errors (depending on the block size, choice of checksum, etc). Though I expect those bit errors are bus/ram, and hopefully usually transient. If there is corruption on the media, the whole block is usually going to be lost because any corruptions means that its internal block level FEC has more errors than it can fix.

I was more thinking along the lines of adding dozens or hundreds of correction blocks to a whole file, along the lines of par (though there are much faster techniques now).

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koverstreet ◴[] No.45083563[source]
You'd think that, wouldn't you? But there are enough moving parts in the IO stack below the filesystem that we do see bit errors. I don't have enough data to do correlations and tell you likely causes, but they do happen.

I think SSDs are generally worse than spinning rust (especially enterprise grade SCSI kit), the hard drive vendors have been at this a lot longer and SSDs are massively more complicated. From the conversations I've had with SSD vendors, I don't think they've put the some level of effort into making things as bulletproof as possible yet.

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nullc ◴[] No.45083695{3}[source]
One thing to keep in mind is that correction always comes as some expense of detection.

Generally a code that can always detect N errors can only always correct N/2 errors. So you detect an errored block, you correct up to N/2 errors. The block now passes but if the block actually had N errors, your correction will be incorrect and you now have silent corruption.

The solution to this is just to have an excess of error correction power and then don't use all of it. But that can be hard to do if you're trying to shoehorn it into an existing 32-bit crc.

How big are the blocks that the CRC units cover in bcachefs?

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1. koverstreet ◴[] No.45084024{4}[source]
bcachefs checksums (and compresses) at extent granularity, not block; encoded extents (checksummed/compressed) are limited to 128k by default.

This is a really good tradeoff in practice; the vast majority of applications are doing buffered IO, not small block O_DIRECT reads - that really only comes up in benchmarks :)

And it gets us better compression ratios and better metadata overhead.

We also have quite a bit of flexibility to add something bigger to the extent for FEC, if we need to - we're not limited to a 32/64 bit checksum.