Remote attestation is a useful capability. One example: it can be used to create a camera such that the photographer can prove that an image is an accurate recording of reality and not AI-generated. Without remote attestation, we will soon enter a state of affairs in which the courts (and anyone else, too) cannot ever rely on photographic or video evidence.
The banking system has been relying on remote attestation for decades to ensure that devices used in settling financial transactions have not been tampered with:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_4758
Also, I think the chip-and-PIN cards used for most in-store transactions in Europe for the last 20 years rely on remote attestation and tamper resistance to prevent fraud.
Finally, in the domain of desktop and laptop computers, there is a big security hole in that most components (certainly, disk drives and storage devices, but basically any peripheral or board) are essentially embedded computers that can be pwned with the result that they stayed pwned even if the owner of the computer installs the OS from scratch. One solution to this would be for suppliers of peripherals and boards to get much better at securing their products or to stop using microprocessor to implement their products, but it would be quite a lot of work (and governmental intervention or at least intervention by industry-wide quasi-governmental entities that currently do not exist) to get from the current situation to the one I just described. The only products currently available that are secure against this threat (aside perhaps from using 40-year-old computers) use verified-boot technology to implement the security.
I.e., the only desktop and laptop computers you can buy where you can be reasonable sure some attacker hasn't installed malware in the computer's disk drive or track page or wifi module are things like Macs and Chromebooks, which implement the security using verified boot.