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650 points clcaev | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.207s | source
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fabian2k ◴[] No.45063298[source]
Do I understand it correctly? Crash data gets automatically transmitted to Tesla, and after it was transmitted is immediately marked for deletion?

If that is actually designed like this, the only reason I could see for it would be so that Tesla has sole access to the data and can decide whether to use it or not. Which really should not work in court, but it seems it has so far.

And of course I'd expect an audit trail for the deletion of crash data on Tesla servers. But who knows whether there actually isn't one, or nobody looked into it at all.

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Someone ◴[] No.45063548[source]
Another reason is if there’s other kinds of data that gets uploaded to Tesla, and the code for uploading crash data reuses that code.

For the first kind of data, deleting the data from the car the moment there’s confirmation that it now is stored at Tesla can make perfect sense as a mechanism to prevent the car to run out of storage space.

Of course, if the car crashed, deleting the data isn’t the optimal, but that it gets deleted may not be malice.

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1. fabian2k ◴[] No.45063636[source]
Deleting after a certain time makes sense, certainly. Deleting immediately seems dubious to me. Though the descriptions in the article are vague enough that we might be missing some big aspects.

But in the end we wouldn't be discussing this at all if Tesla had simply handed over the data from their servers. If they can't find it, it isn't actually there or they deliberately removed it this affects how I view this process.

Two copies are better than one. If you immediately erase the data, you better be sure the transmitted data is safe and secure. And obviously it wasn't.