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645 points helloplanets | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.291s | source
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ec109685 ◴[] No.45005397[source]
It’s obviously fundamentally unsafe when Google, OpenAI and Anthropic haven’t released the same feature and instead use a locked down VM with no cookies to browse the web.

LLM within a browser that can view data across tabs is the ultimate “lethal trifecta”.

Earlier discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44847933

It’s interesting that in Brave’s post describing this exploit, they didn’t reach the fundamental conclusion this is a bad idea: https://brave.com/blog/comet-prompt-injection/

Instead they believe model alignment, trying to understand when a user is doing a dangerous task, etc. will be enough. The only good mitigation they mention is that the agent should drop privileges, but it’s just as easy to hit an attacker controlled image url to leak data as it is to send an email.

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ryanjshaw ◴[] No.45006210[source]
Maybe the article was updated but right now it says “The browser should isolate agentic browsing from regular browsing”
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1. ec109685 ◴[] No.45006361[source]
That was my point about dropping privileges. It can still be exploited if the summary contains a link to an image that the attacker can control via text on the page that the LLM sees. It’s just a lot of Swiss cheese.

That said, it’s definitely the best approach listed. And turns that exploit into an XSS attack on reddit.com, which is still bad.