Io_uring, kTLS and Rust for zero syscall HTTPS server

> For example when submitting a write operation, the memory location of those bytes must not be deallocated or overwritten.

> The io-uring crate doesn’t help much with this. The API doesn’t allow the borrow checker to protect you at compile time, and I don’t see it doing any runtime checks either.

I've seen comments like this before[1], and I get the impression that building a a safe async Rust library around io_uring is actually quite difficult. Which is sort of a bummer.

IIRC Alice from the tokio team also suggested there hasn't been much interest in pushing through these difficulties more recently, as the current performance is "good enough".

[1] https://boats.gitlab.io/blog/post/io-uring/

This actually one of my many gripes about Rust async and why I consider it a bad addition to the language in the long term. The fundamental problem is that rust async was developed when epoll was dominant (and almost no one in the Rust circles cared about IOCP) and it has heavily influenced the async design (sometimes indirectly through other languages).

Think about it for a second. Why do we not have this problem with "synchronous" syscalls? When you call `read` you also "pass mutable borrow" of the buffer to the kernel, but it maps well into the Rust ownership/borrow model since the syscall blocks execution of the thread and there are no ways to prevent it in user code. With poll-based async model you side-step this issues since you use the same "sync" syscalls, but which are guaranteed to return without blocking.

For a completion-based IO to work properly with the ownership/borrow model we have to guarantee that the task code will not continue execution until it receives a completion event. You simply can not do it with state machines polled in user code. But the threading model fits here perfectly! If we are to replace threads with "green" threads, user Rust code will look indistinguishable from "synchronous" code. And no, the green threads model can work properly on embedded systems as demonstrated by many RTOSes.

There are several ways of how we could've done it without making the async runtime mandatory for all targets (the main reason why green threads were removed from Rust 1.0). My personal favorite is introduction of separate "async" targets.

Unfortunately, the Rust language developers made a bet on the unproved polling stackless model because of the promised efficiency and we are in the process of finding out whether the bet plays of or not.

> You simply can not do it with state machines polled in user code

That's not really true. The only guarantees in Rust futures are that they are polled() once and must have their Waker's wake() called before they are polled again. A completion based future submits the request on first poll and calls wake() on completion. That's kind of the interesting design of futures in Rust - they support polling and completion.

The real conundrum is that the futures are not really portable across executors. For io_using for example, the executor's event loop is tightly coupled with submission and completion. And due to instability of a few features (async trait, return impl trait in trait, etc) there is not really a standard way to write executor independent async code (you can, some big crates do, but it's not necessarily trivial).

Combine that with the fact that container runtimes disable io_uring by default and most people are deploying async web servers in Docker containers, it's easy to see why development has stalled.

It's also unfair to mischaracterize design goals and ideas from 2016 with how the ecosystem evolved over the last decade, particularly after futures were stabilized before other language items and major executors became popular. If you look at the RFCs and blog posts back then (eg: https://aturon.github.io/tech/2016/09/07/futures-design/) you can see why readiness was chosen over completion, and how completion can be represented with readiness. He even calls out how naïve completion (callbacks) leads to more allocation on future composition and points to where green threads were abandoned.

No, the fundamental problem (in the context of io-uring) is that futures are managed by user code and can be dropped at any time. This often referred as "cancellation safety". Imagine a future has initialized completion-based IO with buffer which is part of the future state. User code can simply drop the future (e.g. if it was part of `select!`) and now we have a huge problem on our hands: the kernel will write into a dropped buffer! In the synchronous context it's equivalent to de-allocating thread stack under foot of the thread which is blocked on a synchronous syscall. You obviously can do it (using safe code) in thread-based code, but it's fine to do in async.

This is why you have to use various hacks when using io-uring based executors with Rust async (like using polling mode or ring-owned buffers and additional data copies). It could be "resolved" on the language level with an additional pile of hacks which would implement async Drop, but, in my opinion, it would only further hurt consistency of the language.

>He even calls out how naïve completion (callbacks) leads to more allocation on future composition and points to where green threads were abandoned.

I already addressed it in the other comment.

I really don’t understand this argument. If you force the user to transfer ownership of the buffer into the I/O subsystem, the system can make sure to transfer ownership of the buffer into the async runtime, not leaving it held within the cancellable future and the future returns that buffer which is given back when the completion is received from the kernel. What am I missing?