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122 points waldopat | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.266s | source
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toddmorey ◴[] No.44738229[source]
"The vulnerability we discovered was remarkably simple to exploit - by providing only a non-secret app_id value to undocumented registration and email verification endpoints." So you could sign yourself up as editor / collaborator on any app once you knew the app's ID.

Jeez, that's sloppy. My colleague in 2000 discovered you could browse any account on his bank's website by just changing the (sequential!) account IDs in the URL. In a lot of ways we've made great strides in security over the last 25 years... and in many ways, we haven't.

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roozbeh18 ◴[] No.44739179[source]
20 years ago the school class enrollment website allowed just that by changing account IDs in URL, we were bypassing the priority enrollment. I had fun adding my friends and I to classes we wanted.
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1. cj ◴[] No.44740701[source]
I took a slightly different approach and simply wrote a script that checked availability every minute, and then sent me a text message alert when a seat opened up.

(Upperclassmen often switched their schedules around after the priority enrollment deadline ended)

Not as bullet proof as your approach!