Linux and Secure Boot certificate expiration

It's totally crazy that we have to go through Microsoft to sign things to be able to have our OS run on third parties computers, and that Microsoft manage to win about this so easily as it was never seriously challenged.

It makes more sense if you view it for what it is: Honest Satya's Certificate Authority.

Microsoft showed they can semi-competently run a PKI. The end.

Now had the Linux folks stepped up to the plate early on, instead of childishly acting like Secure Boot was the computing antichrist, the story might be different. But they didn't. We only have shim because some people at Red Hat had the common sense to play ball.

Maybe this isn't a great take, but RedHat/LKF/etc could obviously run a 'semi-competent' PKI, and probably should be. But doing so would allow PC vendors to cleanly segment machines between Windows and Linux (+$$), so perhaps it made the best sense to lay-low and use MS infrastructure for this.

This isn't really true.

MS uses three separate CA's to sign Windows boot loaders, third party bootloaders (including Linux bootloaders) and UEFI Option ROMs.

In theory, no manufacturer has to install all three as trusted. But it makes no business sense to do so - why have two separate hardware SKUs for the sole purpose of lock-in? Once word got out no one would buy from that manufacturer.