Linux and Secure Boot certificate expiration

Just out of curiosity, how good is the secure boot experience these days?

I've had to disable it on all my installations because of either nvidia drivers or virtual box modules. In general Arch based distros didn't seem too friendly for secure boot set up.

Signature maintenance for modules can be fully automated. Enrollment requires navigating a mildly-intimidating interface a single time to accept the new PKI.

Fine for systems you physically manage, anything remote in a datacenter I wouldn't bother (without external motivation)

Which is strange because secure boot should be useful in _exactly_ the situation you don't have physical control of the HW, shouldn't it? I guess the threat model for a common not-that-important company does not include evil data center (and it's dubious if SecureBoot would protect you in reality), but wasn't that one of the motivations?

Well you can tie it to TPM to store your encryption key which should only produce the key when the boot parameters match the key. This is what Windows already does but its not fully supported under Linux and somewhat insecure as you can't encrypt the initramfs (so someone can infect boot process there instead).