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693 points macawfish | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0.41s | source
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xp84 ◴[] No.44544217[source]
So, while I agree that this feels foreign and wrong to me as someone who has experienced "The Internet" for so long, I can't help but wonder if we can separate that from how the offline world works.

I'm asking this in good faith.

Given that:

1. The Internet is not an optional subscription service today the way it was in 1995. Every kid and adult has 1,000 opportunities to get online including on the multiple devices every one of their peers owns, which a single set of parents has no control over. So "Just keep them off the Internet/control their devices" seems like a silly "Just" instruction.

2. The Internet is nearly infinite. The author of this editorial says "then install a content blocker on your kids’ devices and add my site to it". This is a silly argument since the whole point is that no one has ever heard of him/her and it's obviously impossible for a filter (let's just assume filters can't be bypassed) can "just" enumerate every inappropriate site even if it employed a full-time staff who did nothing but add new sites to the list all day long.

So given all of that, how do we justify how the Internet must operate on different rules than the offline world does? One can't open a "Free adult library" downtown and allow any child to wander in and check out books showing super explicit porn. I'd have to check IDs and do my best to keep kids out. It also seems like it would be gross to do so. If you agree with that, why should the Internet operate on different rules?

I'd also like to separate the logistics from the morality here. If you believe it's hard to do it without satisfying privacy concerns, totally true! But then the focus should be on finding a good privacy-respecting solution, not just arguing for the status quo.

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_Algernon_ ◴[] No.44544347[source]
The fundamental problem—and it's a big one—is that in the physical world, age verification does not result in a centralized log of when and where I was, and what I did. If I buy cigarettes I show my paper id to some dude and then buy smokes. It's transient with no record (except the fallible memory of the bloke doing the ID check).

This is not true for the proposed age verification schemes for the internet and that is a big problem. Unless this is solved, these schemes deserve every level of resistance we can muster.

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2OEH8eoCRo0[dead post] ◴[] No.44544404[source]
[flagged]
_Algernon_ ◴[] No.44544419[source]
Age verification is easy. Age verification that leaves no record, is anonymous, and not circumvent-able is difficult. In the physical world it relies on the fallibility of human memory. No such luck with replicated databases.
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chgs ◴[] No.44544499[source]
Site generates random key

Key and verification passed to verifier

Verified list is published

Site pulls list and checks its number has been verified

Site doesn’t know who it is, and verifier doesn’t know which site was verified against

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1. sigwinch ◴[] No.44548633[source]
Break the key in half.

Otherwise, why wouldn’t I just try the last entries from that list?

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2. chgs ◴[] No.44548999[source]
They key would be hashed with the user’s details (ip address, value in a session cookie etc) so someone else can’t reuse it. Hell there are things like elliptic curves and DH which still seem magic to me.

Now sure if the identity provider and the site work together they could negate the anonymity, but given that for the identity provider anonymisation would be the key selling feature they wouldn’t want to risk that. Mullvad I’m sure would be trustworthy enough.