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314 points cjr | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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decimalenough ◴[] No.44536914[source]
> The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.

So the fuel supply was cut off intentionally. The switches in question are also built so they cannot be triggered accidentally, they need to be unlocked first by pulling them out.

> In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

And both pilots deny doing it.

It's difficult to conclude anything other than murder-suicide.

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lazystar ◴[] No.44536962[source]
https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/NM-18-33

well hold your horses there... from the FAA in their 2019 report linked above:

> The Boeing Company (Boeing) received reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The fuel control switches (or engine start switches) are installed on the control stand in the flight deck and used by the pilot to supply or cutoff fuel to the engines. The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. In order to move the switch from one position to the other under the condition where the locking feature is engaged, it is necessary for the pilot to lift the switch up while transitioning the switch position. If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown. Boeing informed the FAA that the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models. The table below identifies the affected airplane models and related part numbers (P/Ns) of the fuel control switch, which is manufactured by Honeywell.

> If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown

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barbazoo ◴[] No.44536982[source]
Same manufacturer, Air India 171 was a 787-8 though.
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shoghicp ◴[] No.44537026[source]
The affected table includes these models as well: 787-8, -9, and -10
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ggreer ◴[] No.44537121[source]
The only affected models were 737s with the 766AT613-3D fuel control switch. The bulletin recommended that other models be inspected and any defects reported. It's unclear if any 787s were discovered to have the issue. Also the preliminary report mentions that the switches were replaced in 2019 and 2023, after the 2018 bulletin.
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lazystar ◴[] No.44537490[source]
still, it at least shows that there's been issues with the locking mechanism in the past. inadvertently bumping something that was assumed to be locked is a simpler theory; i find it hard to believe that a murder suicider would take this route, when the china nosedive option is easier, faster, and has a higher chance of success.
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cosmicgadget ◴[] No.44537569[source]
Cutting fuel just after takeoff leaves almost zero time for the other pilot to recover.
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bombcar ◴[] No.44537825[source]
It's interesting to try to imagine a device that would prevent that, without causing more issues.

My preliminary idea is a "fuel bladder" for take-off that inflates with enough fuel to get the plane to a recoverable altitude, maybe a few thousand feet?

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cosmicgadget ◴[] No.44538093[source]
I think engine fires are still more common than suicidal pilots and inadvertant fuel shutoff activations.
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bombcar ◴[] No.44538312[source]
The idea would be something that is ONLY operational after V₁ and until some safe height.

Or maybe a design that prevents both switches being off (flip flop?) for X minutes after wheel weight is removed?

Again, it’s probably pointless but it’s an interesting thought exercise.

Suicidal pilots are apparently more common than we’d want.

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1. cosmicgadget ◴[] No.44538386{9}[source]
The flip flop thing is a neat idea since a single engine can typically maintain level flight and two burning engines is rare.