←back to thread

A non-anthropomorphized view of LLMs

(addxorrol.blogspot.com)
475 points zdw | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.21s | source
Show context
szvsw ◴[] No.44484909[source]
So the author’s core view is ultimately a Searle-like view: a computational, functional, syntactic rules based system cannot reproduce a mind. Plenty of people will agree, plenty of people will disagree, and the answer is probably unknowable and just comes down to whatever axioms you subscribe to in re: consciousness.

The author largely takes the view that it is more productive for us to ignore any anthropomorphic representations and focus on the more concrete, material, technical systems - I’m with them there… but only to a point. The flip side of all this is of course the idea that there is still something emergent, unplanned, and mind-like. So even if it is a stochastic system following rules, clearly the rules are complex enough (to the tune of billions of operations, with signals propagating through some sort of resonant structure, if you take a more filter impulse response like view of a sequential matmuls) to result in emergent properties. Even if we (people interested in LLMs with at least some level of knowledge of ML mathematics and systems) “know better” than to believe these systems to possess morals, ethics, feelings, personalities, etc, the vast majority of people do not have any access to meaningful understanding of the mathematical, functional representation of an LLM and will not take that view, and for all intents and purposes the systems will at least seem to have those anthropomorphic properties, and so it seems like it is in fact useful to ask questions from that lens as well.

In other words, just as it’s useful to analyze and study these things as the purely technical systems they ultimately are, it is also, probably, useful to analyze them from the qualitative, ephemeral, experiential perspective that most people engage with them from, no?

replies(5): >>44485119 #>>44485130 #>>44485421 #>>44487589 #>>44488863 #
CharlesW ◴[] No.44485130[source]
> The flip side of all this is of course the idea that there is still something emergent, unplanned, and mind-like.

For people who have only a surface-level understanding of how they work, yes. A nuance of Clarke's law that "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic" is that the bar is different for everybody and the depth of their understanding of the technology in question. That bar is so low for our largely technologically-illiterate public that a bothersome percentage of us have started to augment and even replace religious/mystical systems with AI powered godbots (LLMs fed "God Mode"/divination/manifestation prompts).

(1) https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/deus-ex-machina-the-dang... (2) https://arxiv.org/html/2411.13223v1 (3) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/05/in-thailand-wh...

replies(3): >>44486372 #>>44490927 #>>44496159 #
lostmsu ◴[] No.44486372[source]
Nah, as a person that knows in detail how LLMs work with probably unique alternative perspective in addition to the commonplace one, I found any claims of them not having emergent behaviors to be of the same fallacy as claiming that crows can't be black because they have DNA of a bird.
replies(1): >>44488448 #
latexr ◴[] No.44488448[source]
> the same fallacy as claiming that crows can't be black because they have DNA of a bird.

What fallacy is that? I’m a fan of logical fallacies and never heard that claim before nor am I finding any reference with a quick search.

replies(3): >>44488627 #>>44489014 #>>44490632 #
FeepingCreature ◴[] No.44489014[source]
(Not the parent)

It doesn't have a name, but I have repeatedly noticed arguments of the form "X cannot have Y, because <explains in detail the mechanism that makes X have Y>". I wanna call it "fallacy of reduction" maybe: the idea that because a trait can be explained with a process, that this proves the trait absent.

(Ie. in this case, "LLMs cannot think, because they just predict tokens." Yes, inasmuch as they think, they do so by predicting tokens. You have to actually show why predicting tokens is insufficient to produce thought.)

replies(1): >>44502172 #
1. lostmsu ◴[] No.44502172[source]
It's much simpler than that. X is in B therefore X is not in A is what being said, and this statement simply doesn't make sense unless you have a separate proof that A and B don't intersect.