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Deno 2.4

(deno.com)
133 points hackandthink | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source
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bflesch ◴[] No.44488699[source]
Big fan of deno, congrats on shipping.

From a security standpoint it really icks me when projects prominently ask their users to do the `curl mywebsite.com/foo.sh | sh` thing. I know risk acceptance is different for many people, but if you download a file before executing it, at least you or your antivirus can check what it actually does.

As supply chain attacks are a significant security risks for a node/deno stack application, the `curl | sh` is a red flag that signals to me that the author of the website prefers convenience over security.

With a curl request directly executed, this can happen:

- the web server behind mywebsite.com/foo.sh provides malware for the first request from your IP, but when you request it again it will show a different, clean file without any code

- MITM attack gives you a different file than others receive

Node/deno applications using the npm ecosystem put a lot of blind trust into npm servers, which are hosted by microsoft, and therefore easily MITM'able by government agencies.

When looking at official docs for deno at https://docs.deno.com/runtime/getting_started/installation/ the second option behind `curl | sh` they're offering is the much more secure `npm install -g deno`. Here at least some file integrity checks and basic malware scanning are done by npm when downloading and installing the package.

Even though deno has excellent programmers working on the main project, the deno.land website might not always be as secure as the main codebase.

Just my two cents, I know it's a slippery slope in terms of security risk but I cannot say that `curl | sh` is good practice.

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bugtodiffer ◴[] No.44488758[source]
using deno isn't good security practice, their sandbox is implemented like stuff from the 90s
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oblio ◴[] No.44488903[source]
Can you expand on this please? Also curious which 90s tech there inspired by.
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bugtodiffer ◴[] No.44488981[source]
It is matching strings instead of actually blocking things. That's how sandboxes were implemented when I was a kid.

E.g. --allow-net --deny-net=1.1.1.1

You cannot fetch "http://1.1.1.1" but any domain that resolves to 1.1.1.1 is a bypass...

It's crap security

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1. jeltz ◴[] No.44489091{3}[source]
That isn't 90s security, that is just bad code. And bad code was written in the 90s and is still written today.