The speed with which you’ll be able to create and disseminate propaganda is mind blowing. Imagine what a 3 letter agency could do with their level of resources.
Expected reaction: every camera manufacturer will embed chips that hold a private key used to sign and/or watermark photos and videos, thus attesting that the raw footage came from a real camera.
Now it only remains to solve the analog hole problem.
- Watermarking is nearly useless as a way of conveying that information, either visibly distorting the image or being sensitive to all manner of normal alterations like cropping, lightness adjustments, and screenshotting.
- New file formats are hard to push to a wide enough audience for this to have the desired effect. If half the real images you see aren't signed, ignoring the signature becomes second-nature.
- Hardware keys can always be extracted in O(N) for an N-bit key. The constant factor is large, but not enough to deter a well-funded adversary. The ability to convincingly fake, e.g., video proof you weren't at a crime scene would be valuable in a hurry. I don't know the limits, but it's more than the 2-10 million dollars you need to extract a key.
- You mentioned the analog hole problem, but that's also very real. If the sensor is engineered as a separate unit, it's trivial to sign whatever data you want. That's hard to work around because camera sensors are big and crude, so integration a non-removable crypto enclave onto one is already a nontrivial engineering challenge.
- If this doesn't function something like TLS with certificate transparency logs and chains of trust then one compromised key from any manufacturer kills the whole thing. Would the US even trust Chinese-signed images? Vice versa? The government you obey has a lot of power to steal that secret without the outside world knowing.
- Even if you do have CT logs and trust the company publishing to them to not publish compromised certs, a breach is much worse than for something like TLS. People's devices are effectively just bricked (going back to that 3rd point -- if all the images you personally take aren't appropriately signed, will a lack of signing seem like a big deal?). If you can update the secure enclave then an adversary can too, and if updating tries to protect itself by, e.g., only sending signed bytecode then you still have the problem that the upstream key is (potentially) compromised.
- Everyone's current devices are immediately obsolete, which will kill adoption. If you grandfather the idea in, there's still a period of years where people get used to real images not being signed, and you still have a ton of wasted money and resources that'll get pushback.
Etc. It's really not an easy problem.
What does it even mean that hardware keys are extractable in O(N) time? If there's some reasonable multiple of N where you can figure out a key, your cryptosystem is broken, physical or not.
It's also very straightforward to attach metadata to media and wouldn't take a format change.
Can you expand on that a bit? Wikipedia's coverage on this seems mostly historical and copy protection focused.
There's a fair bit of public information out there on theoretical techniques (e.g. https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/71851), but I'm not deeply familiar with what's actually used in industry, for example by imatag.
One critique I can lodge against this is that to me it reads like the security model in this scheme trusts the venue to not tamper with the projection equipment. This may not map well to everyday camera recording situations, where the camera owner / operator may have a vested interest and capability in tampering with the camera itself.
The point isn't to completely, 100% close the analog hole here (and at least one piracy group seems to have leaks of raw movie data despite all of this security), but it's effective at making compliance the least costly option for almost everyone involved worldwide. It's one of the major reasons we've seen a shift by pirate groups to preproduction leaks or alternative methods.