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89 points a10r | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.211s | source
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kevincox ◴[] No.44408014[source]
My main question is in 90% of cases these are installers. How are you actually verifying the software that you install? In some cases it is signed and verified but in many cases it is just coming down from the same HTTPS server with no additional verification. So are you then diffing the code (which may be compiled) as well?

I'm not saying that random running random installers from the internet is a great pattern. Something like installing from your distribution can have better verification mechanisms. But this seems to add very little confidence.

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a10r ◴[] No.44408170[source]
You're absolutely right—vet's scope is focused on securing the installer script itself, not the binary it downloads.

The goal is to prevent the installer from being maliciously modified to, for example, skip its own checksum verification or download a binary from a different, malicious URL.

It's one strong link in the chain, but you're right that it's not the whole chain.

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1. ◴[] No.44408205[source]