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287 points robin_reala | 6 comments | | HN request time: 0.241s | source | bottom
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wkat4242 ◴[] No.44375589[source]
Many passports also contain digitized fingerprint scans. But those are even harder to access. You need a private key that only governments have.
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jwr ◴[] No.44377674[source]
> that only governments have

:-)

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connicpu ◴[] No.44377820[source]
A corrupt government official selling a copy of that key to the highest bidder just sounds like the free market to me /s
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1. charcircuit ◴[] No.44379278[source]
Why would they make such an important key be copyable?
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2. lxgr ◴[] No.44379843[source]
To be useful, that key needs to be present in countless border checkpoint or even police devices, so it's inherently very hard to keep secret.

That's a known trade-off, and I believe some countries accordingly restrict access to their own national authorities (which usually already have access to that data via other means, since they're issuing the document).

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3. hamburglar ◴[] No.44380875[source]
The way computer security people and government officials understand keys and key handling practices is vastly different.
4. Nextgrid ◴[] No.44381275[source]
You wouldn't need the key to be copyable though - it can be an online check - ie. passport sends challenge, terminal sends challenge to government-hosted HSM, HSM sends response.
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5. lxgr ◴[] No.44381595{3}[source]
Good point, but that's in the end a typical availability/security tradeoff, and I could imagine that at least some verifying authorities would rather err on the side of the former.
6. chrisandchris ◴[] No.44381859{3}[source]
Imagine, there are a lot of borders and pösces where duch control happens where internet is not guaranteed.