sure, but in exactly the same way rocks are embedded in reality's information-processing systems are creating temporal experiences (erosion, melting, etc)
sure, but in exactly the same way rocks are embedded in reality's information-processing systems are creating temporal experiences (erosion, melting, etc)
Note that taking the opposite point doesn't require arguing from religion, either.
And what would be a non-religious opposite point? The human brain seems to be pretty physical, unless each has some magic attached to it that enables consciousness?
Property Dualism is probably the most palatable to materialists, especially non-reductive physicalism. Basically, the idea that mental properties are irreducible to physical ones 1:1, but may still map to physical reality. Or that all mental states may map to physical states, without mental states themselves being physical (the things itself not really "existing" outside of the qualitative experience of the conscious entity).
I know that to many materialists that just means that the physical state (of the brain or GPU vram) is the consciousness, but dualism is imo sort of like saying one thing can't be two things at the same time, at least when it comes to consciousness - the vram state is real and correlates to a conscious state, but the conscious state still exists non-physically.
I also understand that many of us don't want to think that consciousness is "something special" or have aversions to anthropocentric theories, but I believe we shouldn't completely write off the possibility that something really is special about consciousness until we solve it, or at least get anywhere close to solving it, which we evidently haven't done at all because we're not even theoretically sure of a good path to make an artificial version of consciousness. It's not like we lack the compute and are waiting for technology improvements, we just don't know how to do it.
> we just don't know how to do it
As far as I know, there is no proof that consciousness exists, aside from the fact that everyone personally perceives it. In other words, one has no proof that another is conscious.
Claude effectively claims to be conscious, why should we not believe him?
Sort of, minus the word "is" in "consciousness is..." since nobody, as you point out, can say what consciousness "is." Without some qualifier. "I hypothesize that..."
> But that would also mean that consciousness cannot invoke any quantum mechanics
Well, consciousness isn't known to be physical, yet does influence the physical world (probably), which is a major criticism of dualism from a materialist perspective - clearly, if it's influencing the material world, it's material! But, we don't know, so, no, it doesn't necessarily mean that consciousness can't invoke quantum mechanics if it's not physical.
> Claude effectively claims to be conscious, why should we not believe him?
I agree generally that we don't know enough about consciousness to "prove" it exists, but I disagree insomuch as I don't like to engage in cleanroom absolute theoretics about it - e.g., yeah I can't prove what consciousness is, but I accept that you're probably conscious, and that my friends I know in real life absolutely are, and Claude isn't because it's basically a Chinese Room. I don't have rigid theorics around this but I don't really believe anyone does, so I guess I'm just vibing about it for now.