British naval dominance during the age of sail

> Compensation: In addition to huge prizes—capturing a merchant vessel could make a captain wealthy for life—there was a wage system where officers were oversupplied and naval officers that weren’t at sea were kept at half pay. The unemployment pool that resulted from this efficiency wage made it easier to discipline officers by moving them back to the captains list. (Allen argues that a fixed-wage system would have led to adverse selection since captains on half pay weren’t permanently employees of the navy but would reject commissions that weren’t remunerative.)

I reread this three times and I can’t make heads or tails of what it’s supposed to mean. There is an oversupply of officers. They are kept at half pay. This affords opportunities to discipline officers. This is presumably because there are others willing to take his place, but all that is referenced is a captain’s list. Is this the list of officers on half-pay?

I genuinely can’t even understand the argument being made in brackets.

There was an oversupply of officers. At any particular point in time many of the officers were “on the bench” at half pay.

This made it easy to replace underperforming officers with those on the bench

I may have some of the terminology wrong (but I think they are also using it sloppily?) but that's the basic idea yeah. The "captains list" is the officers eligible to be posted in the role of captain of a ship, which is not quite the same as the rank of captain.

Officers with the actual rank of captain would normally be permanently posted to a ship's command, and only large, prominent, or prestigious warships were captained by captain-rank officers. So it was highly desirable to at least attain that rank. You could get there by achievement on a temporary command which is part of why they were so sought after. Or simply through politics and patronage: the naval officer corps being intimately tied up with both the waning aristocratic and emerging modern nation-state systems.

Officers on the lists were necessarily "gentlemen" in a technical legal-social sense, and were mostly free to pursue their social, family and business interests when not posted to a command. Depending on their resources and connections outside the navy, they could have quite excellent alternatives to a command that was unlikely to make them much money. Or, like younger sons of small or declining holdings would take anything they could get.

Anyway this is what I remember from all the external reading I did trying to make sense of the politics of command in the aubrey-maturin books which is I think the normal way to learn it these days.

Now do the part in brackets that appears to contradict it.

As is customary, I read only what you quoted before the article.

The way I understood it is that main incentive was to capture ships, that's on top of the pay; So, like a bonus structure in modern day and age. If you weren't assigned to a ship, you'd still get paid but half of what you'd get on a ship. Since there were eventually more officers than ships, this created a pool of officers eager for assignments and thus "if you won't, there's someone that will" management style.

Now, a bit more complicated what Allen argued about, also from what I understood, is if captains were on fixed wage they'd turn down assignments (which they could since they weren't permanently employed) since reward isn't following the risk and you'd probably get only the worst or desperate captains to accept the job instead of competent which have all the reasons to refuse.

I don't know, maybe I read it wrong, but it makes sense like that at least.

I think Allen is arguing that, if the beached officers were either on full pay and forced to accept postings by law, or no pay and forced by poverty, they would not be able to reject commissions. They would thus be forced to accept adverse postings that were bad for the navy as a whole.

They were able to reject commissions because they weren't technically employed by the navy while unassigned. Officers could turn down a posting and still draw half pay, and in fact they kept their half pay during retirement.

> you won't, there's someone that will" management style.

But if a head to head battle leads to a 50/50 chance of being sunk and dying, It seems far more attractive to be 'on the bench' at half pay...

And if you were the sort of captain to see it that way, that's probably where the admiralty wanted you. There are only so many ships, after all.

Ok I actually went and read the article by Allen, and I think LessWrong's paraphrasing is a bit sloppy. Allen's actual argument is that because all Royal Navy captains (not just those on half pay) are not permanent employees, they have the right to refuse any commission offered to them. They could then reject any commands that seem too dangerous or unprofitable. This would lead to adverse selection if there were no prize money (for capturing or sinking enemy ships, etc.) and they only received fixed wages. There would be little incentive for captains to take the unfavorable commissions. But the RN did have a very generous prize money system, and the prize money was often much greater than the regular wages. This means that even if a commission looked pretty bad, there was still the possibility of getting rich. Whereas there's no such opportunity at all if one's sitting on the shore. So captains rarely rejected commissions. It's basically akin to how startups usually offer more stock options and the chance to get rich in order to offset the higher risk and worse work/life balance compared to the BigCos.