←back to thread

410 points gpi | 2 comments | | HN request time: 0.426s | source
Show context
neilv ◴[] No.43996445[source]
The article keeps saying overseas employees or contractors, but isn't more specific on who Coinbase entrusted with this sensitive customer PII.

The bottom line is Coinbase didn't adequately secure sensitive customer information, and it was leaked.

Not, "Gosh, 'overseas' people, what can ya do?"

replies(12): >>43996466 #>>43996524 #>>43996557 #>>43996649 #>>43996661 #>>43996746 #>>43997312 #>>43997316 #>>43997530 #>>43997817 #>>43997825 #>>43998830 #
kragen ◴[] No.43996557[source]
It's probably hard to keep call-center workers bribe-proof.
replies(9): >>43996618 #>>43996626 #>>43996651 #>>43996654 #>>43996807 #>>43997178 #>>43997271 #>>43997359 #>>43997458 #
toast0 ◴[] No.43997359[source]
You can take the Google approach of basically not empowering the agents at all. It's not worth trying to social engineer Google CS, because they can't do anything anyway.
replies(1): >>43997516 #
1. miohtama ◴[] No.43997516[source]
Coinbase has the same approach. It's a miracle that ransomware operators got in touch with Coinbase support at all.
replies(1): >>43999915 #
2. robotnikman ◴[] No.43999915[source]
It would be pretty simple actually

>Go on LinkedIn

>Look up profiles of people who work at Coinbase

>Contact and bribe them with a burner account