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560 points bearsyankees | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.209s | source
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michaelteter ◴[] No.43965514[source]
Not excusing this is any way, but this app is apparently a fairly junior effort by university students. While it should make every effort to follow good security (and communication) practices, I'd not be too hard on them considering how some big VC funded "adult" companies behave when presented with similar challenges.

https://georgetownvoice.com/2025/04/06/georgetown-students-c...

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tmtvl ◴[] No.43966578[source]
I vehemently disagree. 'Well, they didn't know what they were doing, so we shouldn't judge them too harshly' is a silly thing to say. They didn't know what they were doing _and still went through with it_. That's an aggravating, not extenuating, factor in my book. Kind of like if a driver kills someone in an accident and then turns out not to have a license.
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LadyCailin ◴[] No.43967142[source]
This is exactly why I think software engineering should require a licensing requirement, much like civil engineering. I get that people will complain about that destroying all sorts of things, and it might, yes, but fight me. Crap like this is exactly why it should be a requirement, and why you won’t convince me that the idea is not in general a good one.
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viraptor ◴[] No.43967749[source]
While the idea is good, I'm not sure how this would get implemented realistically. The industry standards/audits are silly checkbox exercises rather then useful security. The biggest companies are often terrible as far as secure design goes. The government security rules lag years behind the SotA. For example how long did it take NIST to stop recommending changing passwords?

Civil engineering works well because we mostly figured it out anyway. But looking at PCI, SOX and others, we'd probably just require people to produce a book's worth of documentation and audit trail that comes with their broken software.

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no_wizard ◴[] No.43968463[source]
There's no governing body that continually researches, vets and updates standards of security. There should be, honestly, but there isn't. Thats not true of professional engineering organizations, or medical boards, or the Bar Association etc.

They all update their recommendation and standards routinely, and do a reasonably good job at being professional organizations.

The current state of this as regards to the tech sector doesn't mean its impossible to implement.

Thats why all the usual standards (PCI, SOC2 in particular) are performative in practice. There's nothing that holds industry accountable to be better and there is nothing, from a legal stand point, that backs up members of the association if they flag an entity or individual for what would be effectively malpractice.

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socalgal2 ◴[] No.43968550[source]
I feel like people who suggest governing bodies for this kind of stuff always imagine some perfect unicorn organization that makes perfect recommendations where as I usually imaging every UX turning into the worst possible 20x step process because of "regulations" and it will actually just be theater and not actually solve whatever problems it claims to.
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1. no_wizard ◴[] No.43974852[source]
I don't imagine some perfect unicorn organization myself.

I do imagine a technical organization that strives to do its best and would have sufficient scope to protect its members legally if need be, so members would be empowered to make the best decisions possible.