Multiple security issues in GNU Screen

Nice write-up.

> Screen offers a multi-user mode which allows to attach to Screen sessions owned by other users in the system (given the proper credentials). These multi-user features are only available when Screen is installed with the setuid-root bit set. This configuration of Screen results in highly increased attack surface, because of the complex Screen code that runs with root privileges in this case

I wasn't aware of such a feature but I guess it's what makes stuff like tmate possible. Speaking of which, I wonder if tmux is affected by the same kind of vulnerability.

No, tmux uses unix domain sockets. I have no idea why screen chose to take the setuid approach instead here; it seems totally unnecessary to have root privileges.

EDIT: Further down, TFA gives a plausible explanation: the current screen devs are not fully familiar with the code base. If so, the setuid-root approach was probably the easiest way to make the feature work in lieu of such familiarity.

screen has a lot of architectural baggage that can be traced back to its initial 1987 comp.sources.unix/mod.sources versions in some cases. Being set-UID to the superuser is one of them. See the doco for screen as it was posted in volume 10:

https://sources.vsta.org/comp.sources.unix/volume10/screen/

It's a combination of factors:

* The original author of the project has not been involved in it since 1990. The people who took it over and made it a GNU project then largely stopped working on it in 2004. The people who are now working on it are something like its 3rd or 4th wave of developers.

* Learning the internals of screen now from scratch is a lot harder than when I did it in 1987. There's an awful lot more operating system historical and portability factors, now. In 1987, it was works-on-4.3BSD-might-not-on-your-Unix.

* If you deal with pseudo-terminals cross-platform, there are still huge variations on how pseudo-terminals work and how the long-standing security issues of pseudo-terminals, identified in the 1990s, have been addressed in operating systems.

* screen is encumbered by a lot of 1980s Think. It still today diligently manages, and puts quite a lot of effort into constructing, a generated-on-the-fly TERMCAP environment variable, for example.

* Attitudes to security have changed. At least one security hole in the headlined report was actually a neat-o feature of terminals in Unix in the 1970s and 1980s.

What's your point besides whining about the general state of "delevopers", whoever that is? Are you volunteering to take over maintenance of GNU Screen?

Really, the gall to complain about "laziness" when all you're doing is spreading negativity on a forum.