←back to thread

603 points scalewithlee | 4 comments | | HN request time: 0.001s | source
Show context
matt_heimer ◴[] No.43794013[source]
The people configuring WAF rules at CDNs tend to do a poor job understanding sites and services that discuss technical content. It's not just Cloudflare, Akamai has the same problem.

If your site discusses databases then turning on the default SQL injection attack prevention rules will break your site. And there is another ruleset for file inclusion where things like /etc/hosts and /etc/passwd get blocked.

I disagree with other posts here, it is partially a balance between security and usability. You never know what service was implemented with possible security exploits and being able to throw every WAF rule on top of your service does keep it more secure. Its just that those same rulesets are super annoying when you have a securely implemented service which needs to discuss technical concepts.

Fine tuning the rules is time consuming. You often have to just completely turn off the ruleset because when you try to keep the ruleset on and allow the use-case there are a ton of changes you need to get implemented (if its even possible). Page won't load because /etc/hosts was in a query param? Okay, now that you've fixed that, all the XHR included resources won't load because /etc/hosts is included in the referrer. Now that that's fixed things still won't work because some random JS analytics lib put the URL visited in a cookie, etc, etc... There is a temptation to just turn the rules off.

replies(14): >>43794129 #>>43794136 #>>43794174 #>>43794203 #>>43794226 #>>43794234 #>>43794368 #>>43794502 #>>43795948 #>>43796540 #>>43798420 #>>43800243 #>>43804110 #>>43805902 #
mjr00 ◴[] No.43794226[source]
> I disagree with other posts here, it is partially a balance between security and usability.

And economics. Many people here are blaming incompetent security teams and app developers, but a lot of seemingly dumb security policies are due to insurers. If an insurer says "we're going to jack up premiums by 20% unless you force employees to change their password once every 90 days", you can argue till you're blue in the face that it's bad practice, NIST changed its policy to recommend not regularly rotating passwords over a decade ago, etc., and be totally correct... but they're still going to jack up premiums if you don't do it. So you dejectedly sigh, implement a password expiration policy, and listen to grumbling employees who call you incompetent.

It's been a while since I've been through a process like this, but given how infamous log4shell became, it wouldn't surprise me if insurers are now also making it mandatory that common "hacking strings" like /etc/hosts, /etc/passwd, jndi:, and friends must be rejected by servers.

replies(12): >>43794339 #>>43794401 #>>43794476 #>>43794485 #>>43794676 #>>43794868 #>>43795485 #>>43797735 #>>43799077 #>>43799776 #>>43800796 #>>43802890 #
betaby ◴[] No.43794676[source]
> but a lot of seemingly dumb security policies are due to insurers.

I keep hearing that often on HN, however I've personally never seen seen such demands from insurers. I would greatly appreciate if one share such insurance policy. Insurance policies are not trade secrets and OK to be public. I can google plenty of commercial cars insurance policies for example.

replies(4): >>43795927 #>>43796043 #>>43796220 #>>43799059 #
simonw ◴[] No.43796043[source]
I found an example!

https://retail.direct.zurich.ch/resources/definition/product...

Questionnaire Zurich Cyber Insurance

Question 4.2: "Do you have a technically enforced password policy that ensures use of strong passwords and that passwords are changed at least quarterly?"

Since this is an insurance questionnaire, presumably your answers to that question affect the rates you get charged?

(Found that with the help of o4-mini https://chatgpt.com/share/680bc054-77d8-8006-88a1-a6928ab99a...)

replies(3): >>43796612 #>>43797794 #>>43799962 #
kiitos ◴[] No.43796612[source]
Directly following is question 4.3: "Are users always prevented from installing programs on end-user devices?"

Totally bonkers stuff.

replies(2): >>43796821 #>>43797188 #
pjmlp ◴[] No.43797188{3}[source]
This is standard practice for years in big corporations.

You install software via ticket requests to IT, and devs might have admin rights, but not root, and only temporary.

This is nothing new though, back in the timesharing days, where we would connect to the development server, we only got as much rights as required for the ongoing development workflows.

Hence why PCs felt so liberating.

replies(1): >>43797808 #
betaby ◴[] No.43797808{4}[source]
It's a standard practice. And at $CURENT_JOB it's driven by semi-literate security folks, definitely not insurance.
replies(1): >>43797948 #
1. pjmlp ◴[] No.43797948{5}[source]
Insurance and liability concerns drive the security folks.

Just wait when more countries keep adopting cybersecurity laws for companies liabilities when software doesn't behave, like in any other engineering industry.

replies(1): >>43799134 #
2. stefan_ ◴[] No.43799134[source]
Hello, the security folks in those companies made those up. "cyber insurance" is hogwash. That entire branch has been taken over by useless middle manager types who know to type up checklists in Word but have no understanding of anything.
replies(2): >>43799649 #>>43801191 #
3. blangk ◴[] No.43799649[source]
Are you arguing non technical people should have root access to company owned and managed PCs? Because I can tell you from experience, that will result in a very bad time at some point. Even if it is just for the single end user and not the wider org.
4. pjmlp ◴[] No.43801191[source]
As someone that happens to also be one of those clueless people when assuming DevOps roles in consulting projects, it is a very bad day when some clever user is responsible for a security breach.

A breach can turn out into enough money being lost, in credibility, canceled orders, or lawsuits, big enough to close shop, or having to fire those that thought security rules were dumb.

Also anyone with security officer title, in many countries has legal responsibilities when something goes wrong, so when they sign off software deliverables that go wrong, is their signature on the approval.