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603 points scalewithlee | 1 comments | | HN request time: 0.215s | source
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matt_heimer ◴[] No.43794013[source]
The people configuring WAF rules at CDNs tend to do a poor job understanding sites and services that discuss technical content. It's not just Cloudflare, Akamai has the same problem.

If your site discusses databases then turning on the default SQL injection attack prevention rules will break your site. And there is another ruleset for file inclusion where things like /etc/hosts and /etc/passwd get blocked.

I disagree with other posts here, it is partially a balance between security and usability. You never know what service was implemented with possible security exploits and being able to throw every WAF rule on top of your service does keep it more secure. Its just that those same rulesets are super annoying when you have a securely implemented service which needs to discuss technical concepts.

Fine tuning the rules is time consuming. You often have to just completely turn off the ruleset because when you try to keep the ruleset on and allow the use-case there are a ton of changes you need to get implemented (if its even possible). Page won't load because /etc/hosts was in a query param? Okay, now that you've fixed that, all the XHR included resources won't load because /etc/hosts is included in the referrer. Now that that's fixed things still won't work because some random JS analytics lib put the URL visited in a cookie, etc, etc... There is a temptation to just turn the rules off.

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mjr00 ◴[] No.43794226[source]
> I disagree with other posts here, it is partially a balance between security and usability.

And economics. Many people here are blaming incompetent security teams and app developers, but a lot of seemingly dumb security policies are due to insurers. If an insurer says "we're going to jack up premiums by 20% unless you force employees to change their password once every 90 days", you can argue till you're blue in the face that it's bad practice, NIST changed its policy to recommend not regularly rotating passwords over a decade ago, etc., and be totally correct... but they're still going to jack up premiums if you don't do it. So you dejectedly sigh, implement a password expiration policy, and listen to grumbling employees who call you incompetent.

It's been a while since I've been through a process like this, but given how infamous log4shell became, it wouldn't surprise me if insurers are now also making it mandatory that common "hacking strings" like /etc/hosts, /etc/passwd, jndi:, and friends must be rejected by servers.

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lucianbr ◴[] No.43794476[source]
There should be some limits and some consequences to the insurer as well. I don't think the insurer is god and should be able to request anything no matter if it makes sense or not and have people and companies comply.

If anything, I think this attitude is part of the problem. Management, IT security, insurers, governing bodies, they all just impose rules with (sometimes, too often) zero regard for consequences to anyone else. If no pushback mechanism exists against insurer requirements, something is broken.

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mjr00 ◴[] No.43794639[source]
> There should be some limits and some consequences to the insurer as well. I don't think the insurer is god and should be able to request anything no matter if it makes sense or not and have people and companies comply.

If the insurer requested something unreasonable, you'd go to a different insurer. It's a competitive market after all. But most of the complaints about incompetent security practices boil down to minor nuisances in the grand scheme of things. Forced password changes once every 90 days is dumb and slightly annoying but doesn't significantly impact business operations. Having to run some "enterprise security tool" and go through every false positive result (of which there will be many) and provide an explanation as to why it's a false positive is incredibly annoying and doesn't help your security, but it's also something you could have a $50k/year security intern do. Turning on a WAF that happens to reject the 0.0001% of Substack articles which talk about /etc/hosts isn't going to materially change Substack's revenue this year.

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vladvasiliu ◴[] No.43794797[source]
The issue is that the Finance dept will show up and ask why you chose the more expensive insurance. Sure, if you're able to show how much the annoyances of the cheaper company would cost you, they'd probably shut it. But I'd argue it's not that easy. Plus, all these annoyances aren't borne by the security team, so they don't care that much in the end.
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1. HappMacDonald ◴[] No.43797419[source]
My first thought might be to put together a report showing the cost that the cheaper insurance would impose upon the organization which the more expensive up-front option is saving you. Perhaps even serve that up as a cost-savings the finance department is free to then take credit for, I'unno. :P