> this would be unacceptable for os kernels
Depends on the boundary. I can give a non-Linux, microkernel example (but that was/is shipped on dozens of millions of devices):
- prior to 11.0, Nintendo 3DS kernel SVC (syscall) implementations did not clear output parameters, leading to extremely trivial leaks. Unprivileged processes could retrieve kernel-mode stack addresses easily and making exploit code much easier to write, example here: https://github.com/TuxSH/universal-otherapp/blob/master/sour...
- Nintendo started clearing all temporary registers on the Switch kernel at some point (iirc x0-x7 and some more); on the 3DS they never did that, and you can leak kernel object addresses quite easily (iirc by reading r2), this made an entire class of use-after-free and arbwrite bugs easier to exploit (call SvcCreateSemaphore 3 times, get sema kernel object address, use one of the now-patched exploit that can cause a double-decref on the KSemaphore, call SvcWaitSynchronization, profit)
more generally:
- unclearead padding in structures + copy to user = infoleak
so one at least ought to be careful where crossing privilege boundaries