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The Solid-State Shift: Reinventing the Transformer for Modern Grids

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58 points JumpCrisscross | 3 comments | 12 Apr 25 18:23 UTC | HN request time: 0.441s | source
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Animats ◴[12 Apr 25 20:01 UTC] No.43667500[source]▶
Then they'll make them "cloud-enabled" and they will be hacked.

It's scary to see protective relays for power systems with embedded web servers. "IEEE C37.118 synchrophasor measurement, DNP3 Outstation, Modbus TCP/RTU, Telnet, FTP, Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP), built-in web server, and IEC 61850" [1]

[1] https://selinc.com/products/351/#

replies(2): >>43668181 #>>43668553 #
fc417fc802 ◴[12 Apr 25 21:48 UTC] No.43668181[source]▶
It's fine provided that the link from the equipment that feeds it data is optically isolated to only go in one direction.

A public internet connected web server that enables remote equipment control is indeed scary.

replies(1): >>43668317 #
1. Animats ◴[12 Apr 25 22:13 UTC] No.43668317[source]▶
> It's fine provided that the link from the equipment that feeds it data is optically isolated to only go in one direction.

Then people get two of them, one for each direction.[1] Can someone explain why this is supposed to be secure? It's apparently a real product.

[1] https://owlcyberdefense.com/product/recon-2u/

replies(2): >>43668734 #>>43670707 #
2. fc417fc802 ◴[12 Apr 25 23:24 UTC] No.43668734[source]▶
Wut? That reads like satire. The equipment is inside the security boundary, the LAN is outside. What is the purpose of enforcing one-way control signals when the thing sending the control signals is by necessity within the same security boundary as the destination for those signals?

I want to extend the benefit of the doubt and assume my own ignorance but I'm really struggling with this one.

3. mppm ◴[13 Apr 25 07:07 UTC] No.43670707[source]▶
Amazing. Maybe I should pitch them my idea of MIL-spec acoustic relays for communicating with air-gapped facilities?