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170 points flanked-evergl | 6 comments | | HN request time: 0s | source | bottom
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amiga386 ◴[] No.43619870[source]
Users want their secrets to be secret.

Apple wants its users' secrets to be secret.

The UK wants the fact it wants Apple to reveal anyone's secrets to be secret.

replies(1): >>43619903 #
HPsquared ◴[] No.43619903[source]
There must be a healthy middle ground between mass untouchable criminal communication networks on the one hand, and full panopticon 24x7 for every civilian on the other. Or I don't know, maybe there isn't. But at least the debate should be public.
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gigatexal ◴[] No.43619938[source]
The math doesn’t math when it comes to encryption. It’s Pandora’s box. Once backdoors are created encryption may as well not even be enabled.
replies(1): >>43619962 #
gambiting ◴[] No.43619962[source]
Well - maybe. But take for example how Microsoft is doing bitlocker encryption on every Win11 system - by default, without prompting the user, your system drive gets encrypted automatically and the encryption key gets saved to your microsoft account.

Yes I hate that they do that without prompting, but in theory that solution offers that balance that OP talks about - if there are no backdoors in Bitlocker(let's assume that there aren't), then your encrypted data is perfectly secure. But if a judge issues a warrant for your data, then Microsoft can provide them with a key to unlock your device.

To me, that's an acceptable compromise - it means that someone stealing my laptop won't get my data, but if a warrant is produced then bitlocker drives can be unlocked for a criminal investigation.

Couldn't Apple create a solution where all your communication is end to end encrypted with a key that they just have a copy of? No backdoors necessary.

replies(1): >>43619983 #
pjc50 ◴[] No.43619983[source]
> Couldn't Apple create a solution where all your communication is end to end encrypted with a key that they just have a copy of? No backdoors necessary.

But that is a backdoor!

Especially, it's a backdoor that's inside a foreign country and subject to their intelligence services! It might be valid for a hypothetical autochthonous UKphone, but having a system where the US can secretly crack all UK comms is .. not ideal.

Given the tendency of UK ministers to use Whatsapp for private government communications, should we allow the US to have a backdoor into all of that via Meta? (in practice, they tend to leak to newspapers themselves, but it's the principle)

replies(2): >>43620014 #>>43620021 #
johnisgood ◴[] No.43620014[source]
It really is.

> then Microsoft can provide them with a key to unlock your device.

This is a quote from parent. That renders the key and encryption itself pretty useless if it has been given to someone other than you.

replies(1): >>43620073 #
gambiting ◴[] No.43620073[source]
Well, I disagree that it's useless - my front door still keeps my home secure even though my sister has a copy of the key.

I want my devices to be secure from thieves who might steal them, and I want my communications to be secure from someone intercepting internet traffic at various locations I might visit - that is still achieved in that scenario, even if MS/Apple hold the copy of the key. That doesn't make the encryption useless - just ineffective if your attack vector is defending yourself against state-level actors.

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1. johnisgood ◴[] No.43620100{3}[source]
Yeah, your sister. Now go ahead and give it to a stranger.

Once your key is in the hand of a third party, you lost control of that data, and you have to trust them that they will not give it out to someone else (they will), and you have to trust them to keep it safe, and you have to trust them to [...].

My private key is mine, and mine only, or supposed to be.

replies(1): >>43620155 #
2. gambiting ◴[] No.43620155[source]
>> Now go ahead and give it to a stranger.

Well, maybe a better example then - I have a secure storage deposit with a bank. I'm 100% sure it's secure from opportunistic criminals and no one, including the government, knows what's inside it, however, the bank still holds a master key for that deposit box in case it's compelled to open it for law enforcement.

>>My private key is mine, and mine only, or supposed to be.

Again, OP was talking about balance - how do we make sure that people's private communications are safe from criminals, but at the same time allow law enforcement to look at them if needed. To which my answer is - that's how. That's doesn't make encryption "useless", it's just that this model doesn't fit your specific usecase.

replies(2): >>43620242 #>>43620337 #
3. pjc50 ◴[] No.43620242[source]
> the bank still holds a master key for that deposit box in case it's compelled to open it for law enforcement.

.. so they can steal it.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2023/12/11/...

replies(1): >>43620469 #
4. ◴[] No.43620337[source]
5. ryandrake ◴[] No.43620469{3}[source]
Excellent example of why your stuff (be it messages or valuables) are not safe if anyone else has the key.
replies(1): >>43622255 #
6. gambiting ◴[] No.43622255{4}[source]
That is obviously 100% correct, I just find it interesting that we all expect our data storage to be in this completely unbreakable vault that no one can get to even with a valid court warrant, but there is no such expectation for physical spaces. Even the most secure Swiss bank will have to open their vault when the police turn up with a valid warrant.